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¶1 On March 14, 2012 the International Criminal Court (ICC) rendered its first judgment.
Thomas Lubanga, President of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), was convicted of the
enlistment and conscription of children under 15 in his army the Forces Patriotiques pour la
Libération du Congo (FPLC) and using them to participate actively in hostilities.1
¶2 International opinion has welcomed his conviction as “an important step forward in the
worldwide struggle against impunity for grave crimes.”2 The Lubanga verdict has been hailed as
a “landmark ruling,”3 and a “great victory” for child soldiers in Congo and elsewhere,4 although
* Since 2002, the author has been involved in the defense of several defendants in international criminal proceedings
before the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and ICC (Katanga and Ruto). The views expressed in this paper and many of the
factual assertions about investigations are based on the author’s extensive personal experience in conducting defense
investigations in DRC, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and Rwanda. The author wishes to express gratitude to Ben Gumpert
for his invaluable input, as well as Logan Hambrick and Christopher Santora for their helpful suggestions to
improve this paper.
1 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute
(Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf [hereinafter Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-
01/06-2842]; see also ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, Decision on Sentence
Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1438370.pdf (Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo has since been sentenced to 14 years imprisonment).
2 David Smith, Congo Warlord Thomas Lubanga Convicted of Using Child Soldiers, GUARDIAN, (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/14/congo-thomas-lubanga-child-soldiers; see also Michael Bochenek,
DRC: ICC Conviction of Thomas Lubanga Welcomed, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=19998; Marie Lamensch, Democratic Republic of Congo:
Domestic Media Monitoring Report, MONTREAL INST. FOR GENOCIDE & HUMAN RIGHTS STUDIES 2 (Mar. 9–18,
2012),
http://migs.concordia.ca/Media_Monitoring/documents/DRC_Domestic_Media_Monitoring_Report_9_March_18_
March_2012.pdf (reporting U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon welcomed verdict as “an important step forward”
in fight against use of child soldiers, Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika
Coomaraswamy, said verdict will “serve as a strong deterrent,” and head of MONUSCO in DRC referred to
judgment was a “powerful message” to perpetrators of human rights violations who “will be held accountable for
their actions”); Julie McBride, Assessing Lubanga, HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRELAND (Mar. 19, 2012),
http://www.humanrights.ie/index.php/2012/03/19/assessing-lubanga; Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, ICC
Convicts Thomas Lubanga Dyilo for War Crimes, LUBANGATRIAL.ORG (June 11, 2012),
http://www.lubangatrial.org/2012/06/11/icc-convicts-thomas-lubanga-dyilo-for-war-crimes-reactions-from-drc-
partners/ (discussing reactions of their partners in the DRC, including the Ligue pour la solidarité Congolaise
(LSC), and referring to Lubanga judgment as “an important step in the fight against impunity in the DRC” and “a
strong signal to all those who committed serious human rights violations”).
3 ICC: Landmark Verdict a Warning to Rights Abusers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/14/icc-landmark-verdict-warning-rights-abusers; Priyanka Pruthi, In a Historic
Judgment, the International Criminal Court Convicts Thomas Lubanga Dyilo of Recruiting Children Into Armed
Conflict, UNICEF (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.unicef.org/protection/57929_62002.html.
4 Géraldine Mattioli-Zeltner, International Justice Advocacy Director of HRW, called the Lubanga verdict “a victory
for the thousands of children forced to fight in Congo’s brutal wars.” Landmark Verdict, HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra
note 3; see also McBride, Assessing Lubanga, supra note 2 (quoting HRW Executive Director Kenneth Roth
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commentators have criticized the Prosecutor for failing to charge any offences of sexual violence
or other serious crimes punishable under the Rome Statute. Mainly on this basis, a number of
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have concluded that “[l]essons need to be learned for
future cases.”5
¶3 But does the judgment represent a “victory,” however flawed? Although this is now a topic
of discussion,6 initially, there was near complete silence on the ‘dark side’ of the judges’
findings.7 Nine witnesses who claimed to have been child soldiers in the FPLC gave evidence at
the trial. Not one of them was found by the Court to have been honest and reliable.8 Roughly a
third of the judgment (157 out of 593 pages) is taken up with the Court’s detailed and careful
findings on these witnesses and the “intermediaries” (liaison officers facilitating contact with
potential witnesses)9 who may have manipulated them.10
making same statement).
5 HRW researcher Anneka Van Woudenberg urged that other co-accused be arrested and brought to justice as well,
noting that other officers could be found in Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC. See Lamensch, Congo, supra note 2; see
also Bochenek, DRC, supra note 2; Landmark Verdict, HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 3; Women’s Initiatives, ICC
Convicts Lubanga, supra note 2.
6 See, e.g., Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, Lubanga Judgment—The Prosecution’s Investigation and Use of
Intermediaries, LUBANGATRIAL.ORG (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.lubangatrial.org/2012/08/20/lubanga-judgment-
the-prosecutions-investigation-and-use-of-intermediaries/. See also ‘The Law and Practice of the International
Criminal Court: Achievements, Impact and Challenges’ Conference (Sept. 26, 2012) (The criticism raised by the
Lubanga Trial Chamber in respect to the prosecution investigations was also discussed at length at the Conference).
In addition, the War Crimes Research Office is in the process of finalizing a report on the problematic aspects of the
ICC Prosecution’s investigative practices, as was discussed by its director Susana SáCouto at the Conference.
Susana SáCouto, Director, ICC War Crimes Research Office, Remarks at ‘The Law and Practice of the International
Criminal Court: Achievements, Impact and Challenges’ Conference (Sept. 26, 2012).
7 There were a number of notable exceptions. See, e.g., Landmark Verdict, HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 3
(addresses this criticism); see also Alison Cole, Lubanga: A Landmark Decision for International Justice,
LUBANGATRIAL.ORG (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.lubangatrial.org/2012/03/14/a-landmark-decision-for-
international-justice/. When the issue of intermediaries was first raised, a number of NGOs made comments. See,
e.g., Open Society Justice Initiative, Intermediaries and the International Criminal Court: A Role for the Assembly
of States Parties (Nov. 2012), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/intermediaries-
20111212.pdf. There have further been a number of earlier academic publications commenting on the same issue.
See Christian M. De Vos, Case Note: Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: ‘Someone Who Comes Between One
Person and Another’: Lubanga, Local Cooperation and the Right to a Fair Trial, 12 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1 (2011),
http://mjil.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/issues/issue-archive/volume-12-1 [hereinafter De Vos, Case Note]. See also Elena
Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations 14 UCLA J. INT’L & FOREIGN AFF. 121 (2009) [hereinafter Baylis, Outsourcing
Investigations].
8 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶¶ 479–80. The Chamber also dismissed the evidence of
the three victims who gave evidence. Id. ¶¶ 485–502. However, the Chamber found accurate and reliable, the
testimony of P-38, a former UPC soldier who was over 15 when he joined the UPC, as well as that of P-10 who
addressed the video evidence. Id. ¶¶ 480–81.
9 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2, Redacted Decision on the “Defence
Application Seeking a Permanent Stay of the Proceedings,” ¶ 126 (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1036342.pdf (citing ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2678-
Conf, Prosecution’s Response to the Defence’s “Requête de la Défense aux Fins D’arrêt Définitif des Procedures,” ¶
18 (Jan. 31, 2011) [hereinafter Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2678-Conf, Prosecution Confidential Filing]). See also
ICC, Draft Guidelines Governing the Relations between the Court and Intermediaries 5 (Aug. 2011) (The Draft
Guidelines define an intermediary as “someone who comes between one person and another; who facilitates contact
or provides a link between one of the organs or units of the Court or Counsel on the one hand, and victims,
witnesses, beneficiaries of reparations, or affected communities more broadly on the other.”). The draft guidelines
have been redefined in light of the Lubanga Judgment but have, to date, not been adopted by the Assembly of States
Parties.
10 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶¶ 63–220.
NORT HWE S T E RN JOURNAL O F INT E RNAT IONAL HUM AN RI GH T S [ 2 0 1 3
32
¶4 The judgment is scathing about the investigative failures of the Prosecutor and particularly
the excessive reliance on these intermediaries.11 Lubanga was convicted, but not on the evidence
of those who were alleged to be the victims of the crimes he had committed.12
¶5 At the Atrocity Crimes Litigation Year-in-Review 2011 Conference (Review Conference),
which took place as the judgement was handed down, the Prosecution Coordinator of the ICC
was in no mood to accept that “lessons need to be learned” in this respect. She claimed that the
judge’s criticism concerning intermediaries was “overly harsh.”13 In a rather more cogent remark,
Mark Harmon, former Senior Trial Prosecutor at the International Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), underlined the difficulties faced by investigators looking for witnesses in
conflict zones with poor infrastructure.14 “This is a raw, difficult process,” he said, and the reality
in the field, “actually rolling up your sleeves and having to do one of these cases” differs
significantly from the reality in a courtroom in The Hague.15
¶6 It is hard to argue with this observation. The collection of evidence in international
criminal justice is difficult.16 More questionable is whether the ICC Office of the Prosecutor
(OTP) made adequate efforts to deal with problems it encountered in conducting investigations
in the Lubanga case. Did they “roll up their sleeves” or did they abdicate their responsibility to
conduct proper investigations?
¶7 This paper considers whether the OTP’s solution to its investigative difficulties—
essentially the outsourcing of evidence gathering to third-party organizations or intermediaries—
is justified and effective when conducting investigations in international criminal cases.
¶8 Part II examines the judges’ criticism concerning the Lubanga investigations and looks at
the Prosecutor’s explanations with respect to those issues and to the context in which the
investigations were conducted. Investigations in the Lubanga case are compared with those in
the cases of Katanga and Ngudjolo, two accused who were jointly tried until November 21, 2012
when the judges severed their cases.17 Ngudjolo was acquitted on December 18, 2012,18 while
Katanga’s case is still ongoing.19 Similarly to Lubanga’s case, Katanga and Ngudjolo cases
11 Id.
12 Lubanga’s conviction was based on the evidence of FPLC soldiers over 15 years old and other witnesses, id. ¶¶
645–731; as well as video material, id. ¶¶ 644, 710–18, 774, 779, 792–93, 860–62; and documentary evidence, id. ¶¶
732–58, which included Lubanga’s own speech, id. ¶¶ 1242–46.
13 Transcript of Atrocities Crimes Litigation Year-In-Review (2011) Conference 41 (Mar. 14, 2012), available at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/humanrights/documents/ACL2011ConferenceTranscript.pdf
(Criscitelli added that she respected the authority of the Court and that such firm public criticism is a good thing in
the sense that “[i]t does send a signal that this court is not sort of a kangaroo court, it’s not in the pocket of the
prosecution, it’s not willing to tolerate any kind of measure.”).
14 Id. at 46–47.
15 Id. at 47.
16 See, e.g., DAVID CHUTER, WAR CRIMES: CONFRONTING ATROCITY IN THE MODERN WORLD 139–49 (2003);
ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, SELECTIVITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
REGIME 142–59 (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law ed., 2005); Graham Blewitt, The
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in JUSTICE FOR CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY, 145, 150–52 (Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds., 2003).
17 See ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA,
Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing the Charges against
the Accused Persons, ¶¶ 58–64 (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1529337.pdf.
18 ICC, Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-02/12-3, Jugement Rendu en Application de L’article 74
du Statut (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1529535.pdf [hereinafter Ngudjolo Judgment,
ICC-01/04-02/12-3].
19 By decision, the Chamber notified the parties and participants that the mode of liability under which Germain
Katanga was charged was subject to legal recharacterisation on the basis of article 25(3)(d) of the Statute. Katanga
& Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, Decision on Regulation 55, supra note 17. The parties and
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concerned the conflict in the Ituri region of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
The discussion of the investigations in the cases of Katanga and Ngudjolo is followed by a brief
analysis of other situations under investigation by the ICC. Part III addresses the security
concerns raised, which the prosecution argues is the principal reason for outsourcing the
investigations. Part IV suggests better solutions to the problems faced in conducting
investigations.
II. PROBLEMS IN INVESTIGATIONS
A. Lubanga
¶9 On June 23 2004, the Prosecutor opened an investigation in the DRC.20 The initial focus
was on Ituri, where the fighting had been intense.21 The investigative team of twelve was led by
Bernard Lavigne, a French magistrate.22
¶10 The prosecution called Lavigne (P-582), as well as one of the investigators, Nicolas Sebire
(P-583), to give evidence at trial.23 Lavigne testified about the difficulties his team had
encountered.24 He testified that early investigations were particularly difficult,25 and that external
support for ICC investigations was inadequate.26 Initially, they felt unable to visit eastern DRC
participants were invited to file written legal and factual observations on the proposed change in January 2013. The
defense for Katanga sought and was granted leave to appeal this decision. ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga,
ICC-01/04-01/07-3327, Decision on the “Defence Request for Leave to Appeal the Decision 3319,” (Dec. 28, 2912),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1532429.pdf. On January 10, 2013, the defense submitted its appeal. ICC,
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3339, Defence’s Document in Support of Appeal Against the
Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing the Charges Against
the Accused Persons, (Jan. 10, 2013) http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1539247.pdf. The prosecution
responded on January 21, 2013. ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3347, Prosecution Response
to Defence Document in Support of Appeal Against the Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the
Regulations of the Court and Severing the Charges Against the Accused Persons, (Jan. 21, 2013) http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1543347.pdf. The proceedings before the Chamber have been suspended pending the appeal.
ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3344, Appeals Chamber’s Decision on the Request for
Suspensive Effect of the Appeal against Trial Chamber II’s Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the
Regulations of the Court (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1541349.pdf.
20 ICC, Press Release, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens Its First Investigation,
ICC-OTP-20040623-59 (June 23, 2004), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/the%20office%20of%20the%20prosecu
tor%20of%20the%20international%20criminal%20court%20opens%20its%20first%20investigation.aspx.
21 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 136; EVD-OTP-00222/HRW Report, ‘Le Fléau d’or -
RDC’, 2005, 0364, 0367-0369, 0379-0381, 0388; EVD-OTP-00206/MONUC, Special Report on the events in Ituri,
January 2002-December 2003, ¶¶ 4, 7, 12, 16; EVD-OTP-00205/MONUC Kinshasa, Final Report of the MONUC
Special Investigation Team on the Abuses Committed in Ituri from January to March 2003, June 2003, 0291 ¶ 2;
EVD-OTP-00229, ICJ - Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, DRC v. Uganda, 19
December 2005.
22 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 25.
23 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-Red2, Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, ¶
146 (May 31, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc881407.pdf (Lavigne and Sebire were called pursuant to
the Chamber’s Decision on Intermediaries, ordering the prosecution to call an appropriate representative to give
evidence regarding intermediaries). See also Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 supra note 1, ¶ 125.
24 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, Deposition of
Witness 18-25 (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1298128.pdf [hereinafter Lavigne
Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG].
25 Id. at 21–23.
26 Id. at 23.
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due to security problems.27 The situation was volatile and unstable with active militia in and
around Bunia, Ituri’s principal town.28 During their first mission to Bunia, in September 2004,
gunshots could be heard every day.29 There was general suspicion towards the work of the ICC
and Lavigne felt it was dangerous to leave the area of Bunia, which was under the protection of
the United Nations (UN).30
¶11 It took two years for the ICC to establish its own base in Bunia.31 It was difficult to find
public locations where they could safely meet potential witnesses without attracting attention.32
In the absence of an ICC compound, investigators had to stay in difficult circumstances, often
without a shower.33 Investigators would generally rotate in ten-day periods, but there were
thought to be too few of them to have someone in the field permanently.34 Both Lavigne and
Sebire testified that travelling outside Bunia was inhibited by the existence of roadblocks
manned by armed groups with the purpose of collecting taxes.35
¶12 In addition, the investigators feared that informants would be subjected to threats or
abduction from their own communities if it became known that they had given incriminating
information against some of the still-popular militia leaders.36 Investigators also sought to avoid
creating the perception that cooperation with the ICC was risky business, since that perception
might create a general reluctance to provide information.37 Indeed, informants themselves were
anxious that their identity be protected.38
1. The Prosecutor’s Solution: Reliance on Third Parties
¶13 The OTP resolved therefore to create files for its witnesses that were reasonably accurate
without causing any suspicion within their families or villages.39 Investigators were instructed to
avoid any contact with the chiefs of the localities, families, churches, local municipalities and
close allies of potential witnesses, given their alleged close association with the militias under
investigation.40 Investigators were even told to stay away from the schools attended by the ‘child
soldier’ witnesses and not to request their school records.41 These limitations prevented the
cross-checking of potential ‘child soldier’ witnesses’ ages.42
27 Id. at 18.
28 Id. at 21.
29 Id. at 34.
30 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶¶ 135, 139–40, 142, 151–52, 163 (citing Lavigne
Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 34–40).
31 Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 72.
32 Id. at 77.
33 Id. at 75.
34 Id.; see also Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶¶ 162, 165–66.
35 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 153; Lavigne Deposition, supra note 24, at 35; ICC-
01/04-01/06-T-334-Red2-ENG, Trial Hearing 11–12 (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1343148.pdf.
36 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶¶ 159–60 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-
01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 32–33, 47).
37 Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 25, 39–41, 62.
38 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 156, (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-
Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 25, 39).
39 Id. ¶ 192.
40 Id. ¶¶ 160, 172–73.
41 Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 32–34.
42 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶¶ 161, 173–74 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-
01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 17–20, 32–34).
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¶14 But even with the most careful approach, it was difficult to keep the local communities in
the dark about investigations.43 Any error, the OTP felt, could easily lead to the identification of
an individual, which could have immediate adverse consequences.44 This was especially true
when conducting investigations in small villages. ICC personnel stand out in such an
environment, particularly when they are not of African origin and travel in convoy escorted by
UN military vehicles.45 In these circumstances, the investigators feared that it was impossible to
meet informants without running unacceptable risks, particularly in the small villages outside
Bunia.46
¶15 The OTP came up with two main solutions. First, it relied heavily on the investigations
carried out by the MONUC, the UN mission charged with documenting violations of human
rights in the eastern part of the DRC,47 as well as local and international NGOs working in the
region. Not only was this considered a safer method with regard to witness protection, but it also
saved the Prosecutor resources.48 Second, it employed local persons as liaison officers between
the investigators and the local communities referred to as intermediaries. These intermediaries
were relied upon to facilitate contact with potential witnesses, as well as to collect security
information regarding the region.49
¶16 The use of intermediaries appeared to offer a solution to the problems described above.
They often had links with NGOs, as well as the UN.50 They could travel without raising
suspicion and had a permanent base in the area.51 Potential witnesses, selected by intermediaries,
could be interviewed in safe locations outside the conflict zone.52 Intermediaries formed an
integral part of the witness protection system and their involvement was considered “best
practice” during investigations.53 The OTP began using intermediaries as early as the summer of
2004, although formal contracts between the two were not put in place until much later.54
43 Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 37–38, 62–64.
44 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶¶ 160, 192 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-
01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 62).
45 In eastern DRC people mostly get about on foot or motorbike. By visiting villages in a car, let alone multiple cars,
UN military vehicles and personnel tend to attract attention. This is based on the author’s own experience.
46 Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 21–25, 34–37, 61–62.
47 The Security Council mandate of MONUC includes a human rights component, and MONUC teams have on
several occasions investigated allegations of specific violations. For instance, in December 2002, a MONUC team
was sent to investigate allegations that grave violations had occurred in Mambasa and the surrounding area. The
team interviewed over 350 eyewitnesses. See Secretary-General, Thirteenth Report of the Secretary-General on
MONUC, U.N. Doc. S/2003/211 (Feb. 21, 2003). Since July 1, 2010, MONUC was renamed the United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). See U.N. Security
Council, Resolution 1925, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1925 (May 28, 2010).
48 Julie Flint & Alex de Waal, Case Closed: A Prosecutor Without Borders, WORLD AFF. J. (Spring 2009),
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/case-closed-prosecutor-without-borders; see also Baylis, Outsourcing
Investigations, supra note 7, at 143–44.
49 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2, Defence Application Seeking a Permanent Stay of the Proceedings ¶ 126
(citing Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2678-Conf, Prosecution Confidential Filing, supra note 9, ¶ 18).
50 Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 48–50.
51 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, at ¶ 181; Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2678-Conf,
Prosecution Confidential Filing, supra note 9, ¶ 14.
52 Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 50–52.
53 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2, Defence Application Seeking a Permanent Stay of the Proceedings ¶ 124
(citing Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2678-Conf, Prosecution Confidential Filing, supra note 9, at ¶ 14).
54 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 194 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-
Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 53).
NORT HWE S T E RN JOURNAL O F INT E RNAT IONAL HUM AN RI GH T S [ 2 0 1 3
36
2. Problems with UN and NGO Evidence
¶17 Multiple problems arose from OTP reliance on third parties. The NGOs, particularly
MONUC, were only willing to share their work product with the OTP on the condition that it
was not disclosed to anyone else at any stage of the proceedings.55 Accordingly, under article
54(3)(e) of the Rome Statute,56 the Prosecutor entered into confidentiality agreements with these
organizations, agreeing not to disclose the bulk of the information it was given without the
organizations’ prior consent.57
¶18 Some of the material was, according to the OTP’s own assessment, potentially
exculpatory.58 Despite this, the OTP could not make disclosure to the defense or the judges due
to its article 54(3)(e) agreements with the information providers.59 This inability to disclose
prevented the Chamber from exercising its ultimate duty to assess whether the trial could still be
fair if this material was not disclosed to the defense, and whether alternative measures were
available to compensate the unfairness to the defense caused by the non-disclosure.60 Eventually,
the Chamber ordered a conditional stay of the proceedings.61
55 In the case of the U.N., it is right to impose such conditions as was set out in the Negotiated Relationship
Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, ICC-ASP/3/Res.1, ¶ 18(3) (July 22,
2004), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/916FC6A2-7846-4177-A5EA-
5AA9B6D1E96C/0/ICCASP3Res1_English.pdf. See also ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-
01/06-T-52-ENG, Transcript of Prosecution’s Oral Submissions, 14–15, 84–86 (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc354143.pdf [hereinafter Prosecution’s Oral Submissions of Oct. 1, 2007]; ICC, Prosecutor v.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-55-ENG, Transcript of Prosecution’s Oral Submissions, 1, 4–8 (Oct. 2,
2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc354703.pdf [hereinafter Prosecution’s Oral Submissions of Oct. 2,
2007]; ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-86-ENG, Transcript of Prosecution’s Oral
Submissions, 4–8 (May 6, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc482425.pdf [hereinafter Prosecution’s Oral
Submissions of May 6, 2008]; ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-89-ENG, Transcript
of Prosecution’s Oral Submissions 5–7, 45–46 (June 10, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc506201.pdf
[hereinafter Prosecution’s Oral Submissions of June 10, 2008]. See also ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,
ICC-01/04-01/06-1267, Prosecution’s Submission on Article 54(3)(e) Confidentiality Agreements (Apr. 7, 2008),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc469626.pdf.
56 ICC Stature, art. 54(3)(e) (Nov. 29, 2010) (Article 54(3)(e) authorizes the Prosecutor to “[a]gree not to disclose, at
any stage of the proceedings, documents or information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of
confidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the information
consents”).
57 See Prosecution’s Oral Submissions of Oct. 1, 2007, supra note 55, at 14, 19, 85; Prosecution’s Oral Submissions
of June 10, 2008, supra note 55, at 3, 6, 7. See also Prosecution’s Submission on Article 54(3)(e) Confidentiality
Agreements, supra note 55, ¶ 9.
58 See, inter alia, ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1248, Prosecution’s Submission on
Undisclosed Documents Containing Potentially Exculpatory Information, ¶¶ 8–26 (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc462546.pdf; Prosecution’s Submission on Article 54(3)(e) Confidentiality Agreements, supra
note 55.
59 The OTP refused disclosure notwithstanding the Trial Chamber’s Order. ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1259, Order on the “Prosecution’s Submission on Undisclosed Documents Containing
Potentially Exculpatory Information”, ¶ 3 (Apr. 3, 2008). In Prosecution’s Submission on Article 54(3)(e)
Confidentiality Agreements, supra note 55, ¶¶ 7–10, the OTP explained that it was unable to comply with the
Chamber’s disclosure order without the consent of the information providers.
60 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, Decision on the Consequences of Non-
Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the
Prosecution of the Accused, Together With Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008,
¶¶ 44–45, 50, 60–62, 87–89 (June 13, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc511249.pdf.
61 Id. ¶¶ 90–97. This decision was confirmed on appeal. See ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-
01/06-1486, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision
on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the
Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Accused, Together With Certain Other Issues Raised at the Status
Conference on 10 June 2008,” (Oct. 21, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578371.pdf. For further
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¶19 The prosecution appealed, but the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s ruling and
found that reliance on article 54(3)(e) of the Statute should be “exceptional” and not excessive
(as it had been in the instant case).62 The Appeals Chamber held that the OTP should concentrate
its investigations on generating evidence which could be given in court, rather than collecting
large volumes of material which could not be relied upon in determining the criminal liability of
the accused because of confidentiality agreements.63
¶20 The stay of proceedings in Lubanga was lifted only after the UN agreed that the
information could be disclosed to the Chamber for a determination on the exculpatory nature of
the material and the potential need for its disclosure to the defense.64 By now, the trial had
suffered from serious delays.65 In addition, the availability to the OTP of MONUC and NGO
material created a significant inequality between the prosecution and the defense, which did not
have the opportunity to sift through the material for itself.66
3. Problems with Intermediaries
¶21 The reliability and credibility of intermediaries became a contentious issue in the trial. It
started to go wrong on day one, when the first ‘child soldier’ witness recanted and claimed that
an intermediary had instructed him to lie.67 Many others followed with similar allegations,
affirming under oath that they lied about their age and role in the UPC on the instructions of
intermediaries.68 Some said they had received money or that they had been trained for days by
intermediaries in order to build their stories.69 For instance, witness P-0015 said of intermediary
P-316:
analysis, see Milan Marković, The ICC Prosecutor’s Missing Code of Conduct, 47 TEX. INT’L L. J. 1, 213–21
(2011), http://www.tilj.org/content/journal/47/num1/Markovic201.pdf. See also De Vos, Case Note, supra note 7, at
4–8; and Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, supra note 7, at 123. For a more critical view on the Chamber’s
decision and insight on prosecution policy and dilemmas, see Alex Whiting, Lead Evidence & Discovery Before the
International Criminal Court: The Lubanga Case, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 207 (2009).
62 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor, supra note 61, ¶ 55. See also ICC,
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-77-Red, Ex-Parte Hearing With the
Office of the Prosecutor, 4–18 (Nov. 17, 2009) (“in the establishment of the truth, the relevant division of the Court
says that Article 54(3)(e) is exceptional”).
63 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor, supra note 61, ¶ 41.
64 Id. ¶ 61.
65 The original trial date of June 23, 2008 was postponed for seven months until January 26, 2009. See ICC,
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1343, Agenda for Status Conference on 28 May 2008 and
scheduling order, ¶ 3 (May 21, 2008) (listing the initial trial commencement date as June 23, 2008); Democratic
Republic of the Congo, ICC WEBSITE, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/EN_Menus/ICC/Situations%20and%20Cases/Situations/Situation%20ICC%200104/Pages/situation%20inde
x.aspx (listing January 26, 2009 as the date the trial eventually commenced).
66 See ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1291, Réponse de la Défense à la
“Prosecution’s Submissions on Undisclosed Documents Containing Potentially Exculpatory Information” Datée du
28 Mars 2008, ¶ 6 (Apr. 22, 2008). See also Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, Judgment on the Appeal of the
Prosecutor supra note 61, ¶¶ 5, 11, 63–64, 92.
67 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-Red2, Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, supra note 23, ¶ 25 (citing ICC,
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-236-CONF-ENG ET, Hearing, at 20–22 (Jan. 27, 2010),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1264308.pdf).
68 See, e.g., Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 375 (mentioning several witnesses who had
given evidence with regard to possible manipulation by intermediary P-321). Id. ¶ 389 (D-0004 testified that P-321
instructed him and some others to give false testimony about being enlisted into the FPLC, their names, ages and
where they lived).
69 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2, Redacted Decision on the “Defence Application Seeking a Permanent
Stay of the Proceedings,” supra note 9, ¶ 24 (citing ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-
2657-Conf-tENG, Defense Application Seeking a Permanent Stay of the Proceedings, ¶¶ 82–85 (Dec. 10, 2010),
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He said, you have to change your name, you have to change your identity. Don't
give the true story that took place; in other words, there was a story that they were
telling to the witnesses. And I say that they're crooks. Why is it that I say that
they're crooks and swindlers? Well, instead of letting me tell the true story of
what took place and instead of letting me describe all of the events that I lived
through, they are inventing statements in order to manipulate the investigation.70
¶22 Another witness, D-0016 claimed that P-316 had persuaded him to concoct a story about
children being enrolled into the UPC, as well as young girls giving birth whilst in the army.71
¶23 The Chamber accepted that these and similar claims of wrongdoing were properly
grounded, and made several orders for the prosecution to recall witnesses whose previous
testimony was called into question as well as a number of intermediaries.72 The Chamber was
particularly wary of intermediaries P-143, P-316 and P-321, all of whom it ordered to be recalled
to comment on the allegations witnesses had made against them.73
¶24 Eventually, the defense requested a permanent stay of the proceedings, arguing that the
evidence was so unreliable that a fair trial could no longer be guaranteed.74 The Chamber
accepted there were grave grounds for concern, but ruled that the trial should continue, finding
that the impact of the involvement of the intermediaries on the evidence in the case, as well as
any prosecutorial misconduct or negligence, would be matters for its final judgment.75 As already
noted, that final judgment revealed that, in the view of the Chamber, nine alleged ‘child soldier’
witnesses were not credible.76
¶25 The OTP’s failure to verify properly the evidence it obtained through intermediaries
resulted in considerable and avoidable expenses of the Court.77 Indeed, the Chamber spent a
significant amount of time and resources exploring the circumstances in which these witnesses
provided their information.78 In light of these witnesses’ age, vulnerability and potential trauma
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1201067.pdf). See also Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra
note 1, ¶¶ 322, 353–55, 388.
70 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 330 (citing ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-192-Red2-ENG, Redacted Hearing, 6 (June 16, 2009)).
71 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶¶ 351–54 (citing ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-256-Red-ENG 12, Redacted Hearing, 21–22, (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc924727.pdf and ICC-01/04-01/06-T-257-Red-ENG, Redacted Hearing, 2–4, (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://212.159.242.181/iccdocs/doc/doc926790.pdf).
72 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-Red2, Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, supra note 23. For instance,
witness P-0015 was called back and gave additional details about the lies the intermediary told him to provide. Id. ¶¶
332, 364 (citing ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-264-Red2-ENG, Redacted Hearing,
64–65 (Mar. 17, 2010), http://212.159.242.181/iccdocs/doc/doc1387122.pdf; ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-265-Red2-ENG, Redacted Hearing, 9–10 (Mar. 18, 2010).
73 The Chamber made this order in its Decision on Intermediaries. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-Red2, Redacted
Decision on Intermediaries, supra note 23, ¶¶ 144, 146. The Chamber was less concerned with intermediary P-31
who was not recalled. Id. ¶ 451. In light of his close cooperation with P-321, the Chamber treated evidence produced
by P-31 with particular care. Id. ¶ 477. But, the Chamber found there was “insufficient evidence to support the
suggestion that P-0031 persuaded, encouraged or assisted witnesses to give false testimony.” Id. ¶ 476.
74 See Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2, Redacted Decision on the “Defence Application Seeking a Permanent
Stay of the Proceedings,” supra note 9. See also Prosecution’s Confidential Filing, supra note 9.
75 See Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2, Redacted Decision on the “Defence Application Seeking a Permanent
Stay of the Proceedings,” supra note 9, ¶¶ 74–92.
76 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 480. See also text accompanying supra note 8.
77 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 482.
78 Id. The Chamber ordered the Prosecutor to call both investigators and intermediaries to shed light on issues raised
with regard to manipulation of the evidence by intermediaries. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-Red2, Redacted
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from the conflict, intermediaries could easily manipulate them. The Chamber observed that the
risk for such manipulation to occur was increased by the OTP’s lack of adequate supervision
over the investigations carried out by the intermediaries.79
¶26 With regard to specific intermediaries, the Trial Chamber noted the consistent lack of
credibility of the witnesses introduced by P-143 (P-0007, P-0008, P-0010 and P-0011) and
accepted that “there is a real risk that he played a role in the markedly flawed evidence that these
witnesses provided to the OTP and to the Court”.80 The Chamber concluded that P-143 probably
“persuaded, encouraged, or assisted witnesses to give false evidence”.81 The Chamber also found
that “a real possibility exists that P-0321 encouraged and assisted witnesses to give false
evidence”.82 And as to intermediary P-316, the Chamber went even further: “there are strong
reasons to believe that P-316 persuaded witnesses to lie as to their involvement as child soldiers
within the UPC.”83
¶27 OTP investigators knew that their intermediaries might be manipulative and have their
own agendas.84 However, this did not cause investigators to proceed with caution. For instance,
the Prosecutor’s Office had no difficulty in relying on P-316, who they knew had worked, and
probably still was working, as an intelligence agent for the government of DRC.85 The OTP was
fully aware of defense allegations that the government played a significant role in the conflict.86
They paid no heed; all that mattered to the investigators was that P-316 provided valuable
information despite the risk of bias.87 The Judges were not impressed.88
¶28 The investigators continued to use intermediary P-316 extensively both in Lubanga and the
Katanga & Ngudjolo cases until some time in 2008, long after the investigators themselves had
started to doubt his credibility.89 As early as February 13, 2006, following the discovery that P-
316 had invented an incident of harassment of three children,90 an investigator’s note stated that
“[t]he investigators have decided not to establish further initial contacts with former child
Decision on Intermediaries, supra note 23. The Chamber also allowed the defense considerable time to explore the
issue of manipulation in cross-examination and in submissions to the Chamber. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-
Red2, Redacted Decision on the “Defence Application Seeking a Permanent Stay of the Proceedings,” supra note 9.
79 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 482.
80 Id. ¶ 291.
81 Id. ¶¶ 291, 483.
82 Id. ¶ 483; see also id. ¶ 450 (“the significant possibility has been established that P-0321 improperly influenced
the testimony of a number of the witnesses called by the prosecution”).
83 Id. ¶ 483.
84 Id. ¶¶ 205, 316 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 19,
70–71).
85 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶¶ 205, 302–04, 366–67.
86 See, inter alia, the defense opening submissions on January 27, 2009. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-236-CONF-
ENG ET, Hearing, supra note 67, at 27–33.
87 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶¶ 205, 316 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-
01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 19, 70–71).
88 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 368 (“Given the likelihood of political tension, or
even animosity, between the accused and the government, it was wholly undesirable for witnesses to be identified,
introduced and handled by one or more individuals who, on account of their work or position, may not have had, to
a sufficient degree or at all, the necessary qualities of independence and impartiality. Whilst it is acceptable for
individuals in this category to provide information and intelligence on an independent basis, they should not become
members of the prosecution team. Moreover, any information and intelligence they provide should be verified and
scrutinised by the prosecution, in order to avoid any manipulation or distortion of the evidence.”) (emphasis added).
89 Id. ¶ 294.
90 Id. ¶¶ 313–19 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 3,
69, 75).
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soldiers through intermediary [P-0316], as he proved to be unreliable in his approach.”91 More
senior voices in the OTP decided to ignore these views.92 Lavigne, too, appears to have been
fixated on the idea that P-316 produced credible information.93 He did not want to lose the
support of a source of information he trusted on the basis of “one incident.”94
¶29 It was not one incident. In the following years, P-316 concocted numerous other claims of
threats against his assistant P-183 and himself.95 He even asserted that P-183 and his family had
been killed by rebels, and that the killers were now after him.96 P-316 made this claim initially in
October 2008 and repeated it in October 2009 and November 2010, although he changed some of
the details.97 The OTP knew that P-183 was alive.98 Investigators’ notes drafted between 2008
and 2010 reveal their skepticism and show that they did not even inform the Victims and
Witnesses Unit (the “VWU”) of some of his allegations of threats made to him: they knew
members of P-316’s family were providing conflicting accounts of the alleged incidents, but this
did not stop them from continuing to rely on P-316 and continuing to put the witnesses they had
gathered through him forward as witnesses of truth.99
¶30 Although not as uniform and explicit, investigators’ reports reveal that they did not
completely trust intermediary P-143, either.100 This distrust increased over the years, but the
Prosecution retained P-143 long after the reasons for distrust were apparent.101
¶31 The Chamber in Lubanga concluded that “the prosecution should not have delegated its
investigative responsibilities to the intermediaries.”102
B. Katanga and Ngudjolo
¶32 The cases of Katanga and Ngudjolo, initially a joint case but severed recently,103 concern
two militiamen who were fighting against the UPC in the eastern district of Ituri, the same
conflict zone as in Lubanga.104 The same problems were faced and the same methods used to
overcome them.
91 Id. ¶ 317.
92 Id. ¶ 315.
93 Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 6. Ironically, the Judges
came to a diametrically opposed finding in this respect. See Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note
1, ¶ 483.
94 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 316 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-
Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 71–72).
95 Id. ¶¶ 369–71.
96 Id. ¶ 369.
97 Id. ¶¶ 369–71 (citing EVD-D01-01004 at DRC-OTP-0230-0460 and 0461). The account P-0316 gave to the
prosecution at a later stage differs to the extent that he said his relatives informed him, and his parents had not been
killed, EVD-D01-00372, 0457-0458). When questioned on this matter in October 2009 and again in November
2010, P-0316 reiterated this claim (EVD-D01-00372, 0457-0458). See also T-331-Red2-ENG, 81–82; T-332-Red2-
ENG, 12–17.
98 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 369 (citing T-332-Red2-ENG, 5–6).
99 Id. ¶ 370, (citing EVD-D01-01EVD-D01-01004).
100 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 289–90, 317–19.
101 Id. ¶ 219 (P-143’s contract was renewed until sometime in 2010).
102 Id. ¶ 482.
103 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the
Regulations of the Court and Severing the Charges Against the Accused persons, supra note 17.
104 See ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-1-US-tENG, Urgent Warrant of Arrest for Germain
Katanga, 3 (July 2, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc349648.PDF (reclassified as public pursuant to
ICC-01/04-01/07-24, Decision to Unseal the Warrant of Arrest Against Germain Katanga (Oct. 18, 2007),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc355559.PDF); see also ICC, Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-
Vol. 11:3] Dr. Caroline Buisman
41
¶33 The Prosecutor again failed to put investigators on the ground, save on a limited number of
occasions.105 Only one investigative mission was made to the village of Bogoro before the
Prosecutor requested an arrest warrant against Katanga (and later, Ngudjolo) for crimes
committed in Bogoro.106
¶34 Following this first mission to Bogoro, which was undertaken in early 2007, the OTP did
not return to Bogoro for two years.107 Only in 2009 did the OTP conduct a forensic investigation
in Bogoro, but this was too late to have any probative value.108 The investigation team did not
visit any other important village.109 Until the judicial site visit in January 2012, months after the
presentation of all evidence,110 nobody from the OTP ever visited Aveba or Zumbe, the home
villages of the two accused, with the purpose of investigating.111 The prosecution case was that
the accused were at these localities while they were preparing to commit the crimes charged
from these localities.112 Villagers in Aveba and Zumbe must have been witnesses to these
preparations—if they occurred—but the OTP never troubled to ask them.113 In the judgment of
Ngudjolo, the Chamber expressed regret that the OTP had not visited Aveba and Zumbe during
the course of its investigations.114
¶35 The purported reasons for avoiding onsite investigations were similar to those raised in
Lubanga: the security of the OTP personnel and the safety of potential informants.115 The chief
of investigations in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case, who was called by the Chamber as the first
witness to explain a number of issues in relation to the investigations, spoke of security and
health risks, including cholera, Ebola and Malaria. These risks had, she said, delayed the
01/04-02/07-1-tENG, Warrant of Arrest for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 3 (July 6, 2007), http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc453054.PDF (reclassified as public pursuant to ICC-01/04-01/07-260-tENG, Decision to
Unseal Warrant of Arrest Against Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc455949.PDF).
105 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second
Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief, ¶¶ 450–54 (June 29, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1436184.pdf.
106 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG, Trial
Hearing, 21, 40 (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc787558.pdf [hereinafter Katanga &
Ngudjolo Trial Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG].
107 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶ 454.
108 See Ngudjolo Judgment, ICC-01/04-02/12-3, supra note 18, ¶ 118, n. 266.
109 Id. ¶¶ 450–53.
110 ICC, Press release, ICC Judges in Case Against Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui Visit Ituri, ICC-CPI-20120127-
PR765 (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%2
00107/press%20releases/pr765. The author participated personally in this judicial site visit.
111 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶¶ 450–52; ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-
338-CONF-ENG, Closing Statements, 75–76 (May 21, 2012), http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1423314.pdf. This
was confirmed by the chief investigator in the case. See Katanga & Chui Trial Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-
ENG, supra note 106, at 65–66. Luis Moreno-Ocampo visited Zumbe once, not to investigate but to reach out to the
people. See infra notes 322–24.
112 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-3251-Corr-Red, Corrigendum
du Mémoire Final, ¶¶ 161–62, 175–76, 209–15, 304–08, 311–19, 327–41, 520–51, 624–27 (July 3, 2012),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1436782.pdf.
113 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶¶ 450–52.
114 Ngudjolo Judgment, ICC-01/04-02/12-3, supra note 18, ¶ 117.
115 Katanga & Ngudjolo Trial Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG, supra note 106, at 8–10.
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investigations.116 Furthermore, she held it was too dangerous to travel around Ituri because there
were still active militia groups around.117 The prosecution found similar solutions as in Lubanga:
reliance on third-party organizations and intermediaries.
1. Reliance on Third-Party Organizations
¶36 As in Lubanga, the prosecution relied heavily on the work product of MONUC and
NGOs.118 Similar problems as in Lubanga arose with regard to the excessive use by the OTP of
its power to enter into confidentiality agreements.119 The Single Judge of the Pre-Trial Chamber
expressed severe criticism.120 She held that the prosecution had “recklessly accepted, as a matter
of course, thousands of documents from numerous providers” pursuant to the to article 54(3)(e)
of the Statute.121 The Single Judge marked it as an “institutional” problem and urged the
prosecution to find a permanent solution.122
¶37 Unlike in Lubanga, this did not lead to a stay in Katanga & Ngudjolo because it occurred
at the confirmation stage when no ultimate findings on the guilt or innocence of the defendants
are made.123 By the time the trial started, as in Lubanga, the UN had agreed to allow the
Chamber to review the documents that were marked as potentially exonerating, and most of the
documents were subsequently disclosed to the defense.124
116 Id.; see also Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2690-Red2, Redacted Decision on the “Defence Application Seeking a
Permanent Stay of the Proceedings,” supra note 9, ¶¶ 123–24.
117 Katanga & Ngudjolo Trial Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG, supra note 106, at 9.
118 This is apparent from, amongst others, ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-
01/04-01/07-646, Decision on the 19 June 2008 Prosecution Information and Other Matters Concerning Articles 54
(3)(e) and 67 (2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules, 4 (June 25, 2008), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc520402.PDF [hereinafter Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-646, Decision on
Prosecution Information]; ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-621,
Decision on Article 54(3)(e) Documents Identified as Potentially Exculpatory or Otherwise Material to the
Defence’s Preparation for the Confirmation Hearing, ¶¶ 1–64 (June 20, 2008), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc514860.pdf [hereinafter Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-621, Decision on Article
54(3)(e) Documents]; ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-77, Public
Prosecution’s Report on the Status of the Procedures Initiated Under Articles 54(3)(e), 73 and 93 in Relation to
Those Items Identified as of a Potentially Exculpatory Nature Under Article 67(2) of the Statute, ¶ 1 (Nov. 14,
2007). This is also based on the author’s personal participation in the proceedings against Katanga and Ngudjolo.
119 See Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-621, Decision on Article 54(3)(e) Documents, supra note 118, ¶¶
31–64; Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-646, Decision on Prosecution Information, supra note 118, ¶¶ 1–8,
10, 20–23.
120 See Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-621, Decision on Article 54(3)(e) Documents, supra note 118, most
notably ¶¶ 46, 102–03; Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-646, Decision on Prosecution Information, supra
note 118, ¶ 7.
121 See Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-621, Decision on Article 54(3)(e) Documents, supra note 118, ¶ 46.
122 Id. ¶¶ 102–03. Then, four days before the confirmation hearing the Single Judge was presented by the Prosecutor
with 1172 previously undisclosed items, most coming from the United Nations. The Single Judge noted that these
had ‘been within the Office of the Prosecutor for years.’ See Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-646, Decision
on Prosecution Information, supra note 118, ¶ 7.
123 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-621, Decision on Article 54(3)(e) Documents, supra note 118, ¶¶ 65–66,
70, 77–85, 93–94, 108.
124 From personal participation in the proceedings against Katanga and Ngudjolo, the author is aware that gradually
the OTP disclosed most of the exonerating material obtained under article 54(3)(e) albeit initially with many
redactions. See ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1661-Red2-
tENG, Second Decision on Documents Obtained Pursuant to Article 54(3)(e) and Already Disclosed to the Defence
in Redacted Form, (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1072942.pdf; ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain
Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-931-tENG, Reasons for the Oral Decision of 3 February 2009
on the Procedure for the Redaction of Documents Obtained by the Prosecutor Under Article 54(3)(e) of the Statute
and Order Instructing the Prosecutor to Submit Documents to the Chamber, (Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.icc-
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¶38 In the cases that came after the Lubanga and Katanga fiascos, the number of documents
obtained under article 54(3)(e) has significantly reduced.125
2. Reliance on Intermediaries
¶39 In Katanga & Ngudjolo, the prosecution also employed intermediaries. Two of the
intermediaries whose reliability was questioned in Lubanga—P-316 and P-143—were also used
in this case. Fifteen of the prosecution witnesses were introduced to the investigators by these
two intermediaries.126
¶40 In Katanga & Ngudjolo, there were three witnesses who were alleged to have been
recruited into the militia when they were under fifteen years old (P-28, P-279, P-280). Two of
them (P-279, P-280) came through intermediary P-143, who had introduced numerous alleged
child soldiers to the OTP in the Lubanga case.127
¶41 Once again, the correct age of the alleged child soldier witnesses was hotly disputed.128
Some of them, particularly P-279 and P-280, provided very confused evidence about their
correct age.129 The defense challenged the age of each alleged child soldier, introduced
documentary evidence, and called defense witnesses who contradicted the witnesses with respect
to their ages and alleged membership in the militia.130 In Ngudjolo’s judgment, the Chamber
found that this counter-evidence, in particular the documents relating to the age of these
witnesses, raised sufficient doubt about their correct age so as not to rely on any of them as
‘child’ soldiers.131
¶42 Witnesses P-279 and P-280 had grown up together and had been neighbours all their
lives.132 Evidence showed that intermediary P-143 would meet them together at the same time.133
They were both interviewed at Beni, DRC in the same period and by the same prosecution
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc714513.pdf; ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-
01/07-839-tENG, Order Instructing the Prosecutor to Provide Additional Details About Certain Disclosure Notes,
Inspection Reports and the Report Dated 5 January 2009 (Regulation 28 of the Regulations of the Court), (Jan. 21,
2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc643821.pdf.
125 Indeed, the OTP has altered its policy in this regard and claims it continues to work on improvement of the
quality of its work, amongst others, by “reducing reliance on confidential information”. See ICC Office of the
Prosecutor, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009–2012, ¶ 34(b) (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62-
D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf.
126 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶ 462.
127 Id. ¶¶ 462, 487.
128 Id. ¶¶ 27, 32–36, 60–68, 156, 166–71.
129 See ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-220-Red-ENG, Trial
Hearing, 25–28 (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc983608.pdf [hereinafter Katanga &
Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-160-Red-ENG, Nov 22 Hearing]; ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-160-Red-ENG, Trial Hearing, 74–75 (June 23, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc922590.pdf [hereinafter Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-160-Red-ENG, June 23
Hearing]; ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-151-Red-ENG, Trial
Hearing, 22–25 (June 8, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1005312.pdf [hereinafter Katanga &
Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-160-Red-ENG, June 8 Hearing].
130 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶¶ 25–94, 151–242, 487–89.
131 Ngudjolo Judgment, ICC-01/04-02/12-3, supra note 18, ¶¶ 177–80, 203 (addressing P-279). See also id. ¶¶ 234–
37 (addressing P-28).
132 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶¶ 26, 92.
133 Id. ¶ 487 (citing D2-147-T-261, at 42, 49, 52 and D2-146-T-264, at 42–43, 46).
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investigators.134 They were subsequently relocated and disappeared from their community at the
same time.135 Yet, they denied knowing each other.136 Even when the defense showed P-279 a
picture of himself together with P-280, P-279 denied knowing who the other person in the
picture was.137
¶43 The testimony of P-279 was so contradictory that one of the defense teams, although
unsuccessfully, requested the Chamber to order the prosecution to initiate proceedings for
perjury against him.138 The OTP later conceded that P-279 and P-280 were in fact older than
fifteen at the time of their alleged recruitment into the militia and thus not child soldiers.139 The
Prosecution’s new position was that these witnesses were simply mistaken about their ages and
could still be relied on as witnesses of truth.140 The defense has submitted otherwise.141 The
Chamber agreed with the defense and found generally that P-279 and P-280 gave such
inconsistent and unreliable accounts that neither of them could be relied on in determining
Ngudjolo’s criminal liability.142
¶44 Another witness, P-28, gave a detailed account of being kidnapped with four other boys by
thirty-six militiamen and forced to join the militia.143 He later accepted this account was false
claiming he had acted on the instructions of another intermediary, P-183, although in an earlier
interview of July 3, 2009, he denied that this intermediary told him to lie.144 He could not explain
the contradiction.145 In court, he was firm that he had lied as instructed by P-183, stating:
I did not look for any officers from the OTP or from the Defence teams or from
any service at the ICC. I did not look for anyone. There was one person who put
me in contact with the investigators, and it is that individual who told me that I
had to say that I was returning from school, to give this account about the school.
134 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶ 487 (citing P-279-T-151, at 51; P-279-T-152, at 47–48; and P-280-T-161, at 26).
135 Id. ¶¶ 26, 492 (citing D2-147-T-261, at 57–58).
136 Id. ¶ 487 (citing P-279-T-151, at 48–51). In the Ngudjolo Judgment, ICC-01/04-02/12-3, supra note 18, ¶ 181,
the Chamber found that this denial undermined the credibility of these witnesses.
137 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶ 487 (citing P-279-T-152, at 43–46).
138 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-2243-Red, Requête de la
Défense de Mathieu Ngudjolo Aux Fins de Solliciter le Déclenchement des Poursuites Judiciaires à Charge du
Témoin P-279 de l’Accusation Pour Atteintes à L’administration de la Justice Article 70(1)(a) (b) du Statut de Rome
(Sept. 22, 2010). The initial confidential application was filed on June 14, 2010. See ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain
Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-2195-Conf., Confidential Application (June 14, 2010). This
application was subsequently dismissed by oral decision on September 22, 2010. ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain
Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-190-Red-ENG, Trial Hearing, 1–5, (Sept. 22, 2010)
http://212.159.242.181/iccdocs/doc/doc941333.pdf.
139 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3251-Corr-Red, Corrigendum du Mémoire Final, supra note 112, ¶¶ 781,
788.
140 Id.
141 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶ 27.
142 Ngudjolo Judgment, ICC-01/04-02/12-3, supra note 18, ¶¶ 177–79, 189–90, 192, 203, 218–19.
143 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶¶ 180–85.
144 Id. ¶¶ 183–87.
145 Id. ¶ 481 (citing P-28-T-221, at 25–32, 38–39).
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I am not the one who made it up. I am not the person who invented all of this. It
was an account that I was told to relate.146
¶45 Proceedings in Katanga are still ongoing. But the Chamber recently acquitted Ngudjolo.
Although the Chamber did not specifically address the role of intermediaries in this judgment, it
found that none of the ‘child’ soldiers or other witnesses, who claimed to have been in the militia
and implicated Ngudjolo, were reliable.147 With regard to P-28, the Chamber noted his several
inconsistencies and admitted lies. It therefore found his testimony unreliable with regard to his
claimed role in the militia and participation in the attacks on Bogoro and Mandro. It did not rely
on P-28’s testimony at all in relation to Ngudjolo.148
¶46 It is very striking that the judges in the two judgments issued so far by the ICC, both
relating to the DRC, have dismissed all ‘child’ soldier witnesses, as well as other witnesses
allegedly in the relevant armed groups. All of these witnesses were introduced to the OTP by
intermediaries, This suggests that, also in Ngudjolo’s case, intermediaries encouraged the
witnesses to lie about their age and other matters.
C. Other ICC Cases
¶47 There is little public information about the use of intermediaries in other ICC cases. With
the exception of the Bemba case, which largely takes place behind closed doors, the other
pending cases are not far advanced and the nature of the Prosecutor’s investigations is less clear.
It is too early to draw firm conclusions about the investigations in these cases. Nonetheless, a
number of observations can be made on the basis of the Prosecutor’s own admissions as well as
defense submissions pertaining to investigation deficiencies.
¶48 With the possible exception of the situation in the Ivory Coast, the OTP’s visits to the
crime-base areas are sporadic and subject to strict limitations of security. As a result of their
infrequent presence in the crime-base areas, many steps a diligent prosecutor anywhere in the
world would be expected to take have so far not been taken.
1. North and South Kivu, DRC
¶49 In the Kivu provinces in east Congo, Callixte Mbarushimana was suspected of being
criminally liable for war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by members of the
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (the “FDLR”) of which he was the Executive
Secretary.149 If the OTP conducted onsite investigations in the Kivu provinces, the results were
negligible. For the purpose of the confirmation hearing, the OTP relied heavily on NGO and UN
reports, often one single report in relation to each attack charged.150
146 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶ 480 (quoting P-28-T-221, at 22–23). See also Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-220-Red-
ENG, supra note 129, at 55–59.
147 Ngudolo Judgment, supra note 18, ¶¶ 157–59 (P-250), ¶¶ 189–90 (P-279), ¶¶ 218–19 (P-280), ¶ 254 (P-28), ¶¶
281–83 (P-219).
148 Id. ¶¶ 251, 254. The Chamber, however, left open the possibility to rely on his testimony with regard to some
limited aspects concerning his life in Aveba and contacts with the militia there. The extent to which it will rely on
his testimony is still to be determined in relation to Katanga. See id. ¶¶ 252–53.
149 ICC, Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-2-tENG, Warrant of Arrest for Callixte
Mbarushimana, at 1, 8 (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc954979.pdf.
150 ICC, Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, ¶¶ 117–18, 120 (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1286409.pdf.
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¶50 The reasons that the OTP barely conducted its own independent investigations on the
ground in the Kivu provinces are unclear. It is true that, in North Kivu, the situation has recently
deteriorated, seemingly as a result of threats to arrest ICC suspect Bosco Ntaganda, who has
meanwhile surrendered himself to the US embassy in Kigali and been transferred to the ICC.151
But at the time when the OTP could and should have been conducting the investigations in the
Mbarushimana case, the situation was relatively stable. Until recently, most towns and villages
in North and South Kivu were readily accessible. There were even some tourist activities going
on in and near Goma, the capital of North Kivu.152
¶51 Deficient investigations were partly the reason that the Pre-Trial Chamber did not confirm
the case against Mbarushimana. The Chamber noted “the paucity of the information” in the
reports,153 “inconsistencies between the information [in the reports] and the Prosecution's
allegations,”154 and “the lack of any independent corroborating evidence.”155 The evidence
submitted by the Prosecution was “not sufficient to establish substantial grounds to believe that
the alleged attacks occurred in Ruvundi, Mutakato, or Kahole.”156 The Pre-Trial Chamber
similarly found that numerous other attacks were not proven on the “sufficient grounds to
believe” standard because they were not substantiated other than by assumptions or information
from third parties.157
2. Kenya and Abu Garda
¶52 Up until the confirmation of charges hearing, the Kenyan investigations relied primarily on
the investigations carried out by the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (also
called the “Waki Commission” after its chairman, Justice Philip Waki), an initiative funded
jointly by the Kenyan government and the multi-donor Trust Fund for National Dialogue and
Reconciliation.158 The Waki Commission was tasked with investigating the violence that erupted
151 See ICC, Press Release, ICC Prosecutor welcomes news of Ntaganda’s transfer to the Court (Mar. 22, 2013),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/rstatement-22-03-2013.aspx;
ICC, Press Release, Bosco Ntaganda in the ICC’s custody (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr888.aspx. On the events in eastern DRC
prior to Mr. Ntaganda’s surrender, see ICC, Press Release, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda on Recent Events in
Eastern DRC: Bosco and Mudacumura Must Be Arrested, Now, (Nov. 11, 2012), http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/icc%20prosecutor%20fatou%20bensouda%20on%20re
cent%20events%20in%20eastern%20drc_%20bosco%20and%20mudacumura%20must%20be%20arrested. See also
DR Congo: M23 Rebels Committing War Crimes, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (Sept. 11, 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/11/dr-congo-m23-rebels-committing-war-crimes. The fighting started in April
2012, shortly before the ICC issued a second arrest warrant against Ntaganda, following an OTP request to do so on
May 14, 2012. See ICC, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-36-Red, Decision on the Prosecutor’s
Application Under Article 58, (July 13, 2012). The suspicion is that Ntaganda, leader of the rebel group M23, is not
acting alone, but with the support of Rwanda. See M23 Rebels, HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra.
152 As late as 2012, visitors including this author (in January 2011) came to the Goma region to climb the
Nyiragongo Volcano known for its lava lake, or to see the mountain gorillas in the Virunga National Park.
153 Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 150, ¶ 120.
154 Id.
155 Id.; see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 113–20.
156 Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 150, ¶ 120.
157 Id. ¶¶ 121–36.
158 See WAKI REPORT: COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE (2008), EVD-PT-OTP-00004_KEN-
OTP-0001-0364, http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/WAKI_Kenya_Post-ElectionViolenceReport.pdf
[hereinafter WAKI REPORT, EVD-PT-OTP-00004_KEN-OTP-0001-0364]. Named after Judge Waki, the Waki
Commission was set up on May 23, 2007 and the international members of the Commission were sworn in on June
3, 2008. Id. at 1.
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in Kenya following the disputed presidential election held in December 2007.159 The Waki
Commission compiled a report of 518 pages, including appendixes, detailing its findings based
on thousands of pages of supporting materials collected over the course of nearly a year and a
half.160 The OTP received all of these materials as well as a list of names of persons potentially
implicated in the post-election violence in Kenya at the end of 2007, beginning of 2008.161 In
addition, the OTP benefited from detailed reports compiled by the Kenyan National Commission
on Human Rights (KNCHR), as well as by other human rights organizations such as Human
Rights Watch (HRW).162
¶53 Unquestionably, these materials provided the OTP with an impressive starting point upon
which it could have built its own cases based on its own independent investigations.
Unfortunately, at least until confirmation, the OTP appears to have relied on this information
gathered by third parties in lieu of, rather than in addition to, its own investigations.163
¶54 This reliance is clear from the Prosecutor’s own submissions. In a press release on January
24, 2012, following the confirmation of the charges of four out of six Kenyan suspects, the
Prosecutor himself stated that the OTP had no witnesses in Kenya and that their investigations
had been carried out mainly outside Kenya.164 He indicated that, now that the charges were
confirmed, the prosecution would need to move into Kenya to investigate the crime base and
engage with the victims.165 The Prosecutor did not, however, explain why the OTP had
handicapped itself in this way in preparation for the crucial confirmation hearing.166
¶55 Throughout the confirmation proceedings, all defense teams in the Kenya I and Kenya II
cases made submissions pertaining to the Prosecutor’s incomplete investigations.167 In particular,
159 Id. (The latter was managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)).
160 See WAKI REPORT, EVD-PT-OTP-00004_KEN-OTP-0001-0364, supra note 158. The Waki Commission handed
over its report to the government on October 15, 2008. See Oliver Mathenge, Waki Report To Be Handed Over,
DAILY NATION, (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/480490/-/ywbs9iz/-/index.html.
161 ICC, Press Release, ICC-OTP-20090716-PR439, Waki Commission List of Names in the Hands of ICC
Prosecutor (July 16, 2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/ken
ya/Pages/pr439.aspx.
162 KENYAN NAT’L COMM. ON HUM. RTS. REPORT, ON THE BRINK OF THE PRECIPICE: A HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNT
OF KENYA’S POST-2007 ELECTION VIOLENCE, EVD-PT-OTP-00001_KEN-OTP-0001-0002, (Aug. 15, 2008)
http://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/Reports/KNCHR_REPORT_REPORT_ON_THE_BRINK_OF_THE_PRECIPE.pdf
; HUM. RTS. WATCH REPORT, BALLOTS TO BULLETS: ORGANIZED POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND KENYA’S CRISIS OF
GOVERNMENT, (Mar. 2008) http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/kenya0308/kenya0308web.pdf. See, e.g., ICC,
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey & Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-355, William
Samoei Ruto Defence Brief Following the Confirmation of Charges Hearing, ¶¶ 28–29 (Oct. 24, 2011),
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1251431.pdf.
163 This was one of the defense submissions at the Kenyan confirmation stage. See, inter alia, ICC, Prosecutor v.
William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey & Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-355, Ruto Defence Brief,
supra note 162, ¶¶ 6, 28; see also ICC, Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey & Joshua Arap
Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-354, Joshua Arap Sang Defence Brief Following the Confirmation of Charges Hearing, ¶¶
22–27 (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1251439.pdf.
164 Press Conference held by Luis Moreno-Ocampo on January 24, 2012 relating to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s
decision on the confirmation of the charges in Kenya I and II, issued on January 23, 2012, available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-WYkNYXvug&feature=relmfu.
165 Id.
166 The OTP failed to do so despite it being raised by the defense. See, inter alia, Ruto, Kosgey & Sang, ICC-01/09-
01/11-355, Ruto Defence Brief, supra note 162, ¶¶ 6, 28; see also Ruto, Kosgey & Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-354,
Sang Defence Brief, supra note 163, ¶¶ 22–27.
167 See Ruto, Kosgey & Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-355, Ruto Defence Brief, supra note 162, ¶¶ 4–10, 24–29; ICC,
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey & Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-T-6-Red-ENG,
Redacted Confirmation of Charges Hearing, at 113–17 (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.icc-
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they complained about the Prosecutor’s failures to interview any person with potentially
exculpatory information,168 to collect even the most readily available exculpatory material,169 to
collect any tangible material to corroborate the evidence from the anonymous witnesses on
whom they relied,170 and to follow up on various investigation leads.171 In failing to take these
steps, the Prosecutor had missed an opportunity to verify the accuracy of the stories of witnesses
it relied on as witnesses of truth.
¶56 Similar arguments of incomplete investigations were made during the Abu Garda
confirmation proceedings.172 The OTP chief of investigations testified at the confirmation
hearing, at defense request, to explain why certain steps had not been taken.173 Unfortunately, the
entire testimony was in closed session and thus the explanations remain unknown to the
public.174
¶57 The Pre-Trial Chambers in Abu Garda and by majority in Kenya I and II have taken the
position that investigative failures cannot, by themselves, be a ground to decline to confirm the
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1230545.pdf; Ruto, Kosgey & Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-354, Sang Defence Brief, supra note
163, ¶¶ 4, 16–21, 29–38; ICC, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta & Mohammed
Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-374-Red, Public Redacted Version of Final Written Observations of the Defence
Team of Ambassador Francis K. Muthaura on the Confirmation of Charges Hearing, ¶¶ 69–72 (Dec. 2, 2011),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1252614.pdf [herinafter Muthaura, Kenyatta & Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-374-
Red, Final Written Observations]; ICC, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta &
Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-373-Red, Redacted Version of General Mohammed Hussein Ali’s Final
Submissions on the Confirmation Charges Hearing, ¶ 14 (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1280619.pdf [hereinafter Muthaura, Kenyatta & Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-373-Red, General
Mohammed Hussain Ali’s Final Submissions].
168 Muthaura, Kenyatta & Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-374-Red, Final Written Observations, supra note 167, ¶¶ 71–72.
169 For instance, the Ruto defense argued that evidence of Ruto’s absence at alleged meetings because he was
elsewhere, was readily available. See Ruto, Kosgey & Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-355, Ruto Defence Brief, supra note
162, ¶ 7; Ruto, Kosgey & Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-T-6-Red-ENG, Redacted Confirmation of Charges Hearing, supra
note 167, at 62–72. General Ali’s defense complained that the Prosecution had completely failed to exploit the
police efforts to stop the violence and Ali’s personal efforts to combat the Mungiki. See Muthaura, Kenyatta & Ali,
ICC-01/09-02/11-373-Red, General Mohammed Hussain Ali’s Final Submissions, supra note 167, ¶¶ 23, 27–30, 46.
170 For instance, the Ruto defense complained that the prosecution had not made any efforts to obtain purchase
receipts, bank transfers or other tangible evidence to corroborate allegations of purchasing weapons. See, inter alia,
ICC, Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-T-12-
ENG, Confirmation of Charges Hearing, at 41–45 (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1228849.pdf.
171 For instance, the Ruto defense alleged that the prosecution failed to search for the recording of an alleged inciting
speech that was recorded according to the prosecution evidence. See Ruto, Kosgey, & Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-355,
Ruto Defence Brief, supra note 162, ¶ 22. Both the Ruto and Sang defense complained that the Prosecutor failed to
search for any radio broadcasts of Sang’s and others’ alleged inciting comments notwithstanding that the relevant
radio station KASS FM broadcasted from Nairobi. See Ruto, Kosgey, & Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-T-6-Red-ENG,
Redacted Confirmation of Charges Hearing, supra note 167, at 147–49; see also ICC, Prosecutor v. William Samoei
Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey & Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-T-8-Red-ENG, Ex Parte Hearing, at 51–57
(Sept. 5, 2011). The Ruto defense also complained about the Prosecutor’s failure to follow up the allegation of
coaching and inducing witnesses to implicate Ruto, made by two persons who worked for organizations the
Prosecutor relied on. See Ruto, Kosgey, & Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-355, Ruto Defence Brief, supra note 162, ¶¶ 19–
21; see also Ruto, Kosgey & Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-354, Sang Defence Brief, supra note 163, ¶¶ 34–35.
172 ICC, Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of the
Charges, ¶¶ 46–47 (Feb. 8, 2010),
http://www.worldcourts.com/icc/eng/decisions/2010.02.08_Prosecutor_v_Abu_Garda.pdf.
173 ICC, Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-186, Decision on Witness to be Called by the
Defence at the Confirmation Hearing (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc761072.pdf.
174 Id. at 7–8. His testimony was heard in private session on October 27, 2009. See ICC, Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss
Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-T-18-Red-ENG, Confirmation of Charges Hearing (Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc771525.pdf.
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charges, but “may have an impact on the Chamber’s assessment of whether the Prosecutor's
evidence as a whole has met the ‘substantial grounds to believe’ threshold.”175
¶58 Indeed, these failures led in part to the non-confirmation of the cases against Abu Garda
and two of the Kenyan defendants (Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Mohammed Hussein Ali). These
cases were not confirmed due to insufficient evidence or inherent contradictions and
inconsistencies between witness statements.176 Recently, the case against Francis Kirimi
Muthaura was withdrawn as well, essentially because the key witness against him had recanted a
crucial part of his evidence. The Prosecution was already in possession of this witness’s
recanting statement at the time the confirmation was held, but had failed to make timely
disclosure thereof to the defence.177
¶59 At the Review Conference, when the author raised the issue of apparent failure to
investigate thoroughly, the Prosecution Coordinator’s response was, since the prosecution cannot
undertake any activity without the state’s approval, “a private defense lawyer has, oddly enough,
a lot more leeway in terms of investigating than the prosecution does.”178 By way of an example,
she said the OTP “can’t just go to radio stations in Kenya” as such action requires the consent of
175 See Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, supra note 172, ¶ 48; ICC,
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey & Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 51–52 (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314535.pdf; ICC, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai
Kenyatta & Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, Redacted Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 63–64 (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314543.pdf. In Kenya I and II, dissenting Judge Kaul expressed his disagreement with the
majority ruling that this issue does not fall within the scope of the confirmation hearing. He pointed out article 54
required of the Prosecution investigations to cover all incriminating and exonerating facts and evidence. In his view,
these requirements are fundamental and must be respected at the confirmation stage. See ICC, Prosecutor v. William
Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey & Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-02/11-373-Red, Redacted Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Kaul, ¶¶ 50-52 (Jan. 23, 2012); see also Muthaura, Kenyatta & Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, Redacted Decision
on Confirmation of Charges, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kaul, supra note 175, ¶ 62.
176 See, e.g., Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, supra note 172, ¶¶ 173–
236; Ruto, Kosgey & Sang, ICC-01/09-02/11-373-Red, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kaul, supra note 175, ¶¶ 293–
300; Muthaura, Kenyatta & Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kaul, supra note 175, ¶¶
420–27.
177 The defence has alleged bad faith on the part of the Prosecution, but the Prosecution maintains the non-disclosure
was in error but not in bad faith. The Prosecution asserts it was the result of a failure “ to appreciate that the affidavit
contained an inconsistent statement and was thus disclosable as impeachment material”. See, e.g., ICC, Prosecutor v.
Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-664-Red2, Public redacted version of the
25 February 2013 Consolidated Prosecution response to the Defence applications under Article 64 of the Statue to
refer the confirmation decision back to the Pre-Trial Chamber, ¶¶ 7–9, 41, 44–46 (Feb. 26, 2013). Mr. Kenyatta was
also affected by this witness and asked that his case be referred back to the Pre-Trial Chamber for a new
confirmation hearing, given that the evidentiary basis for confirming the charges had significantly changed now that
the recanting witness could no longer be relied upon. See, e.g., ICC, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-622, Defence Application to the Trial Chamber Pursuant to Article 64(4)
of the Rome Statute to Refer the Preliminary Issue of the Confirmation Decision to the Pre-Trial Chamber for
Reconsideration (Feb. 5, 2013). The Chamber has not yet ruled on this issue, nor has it yet determined whether the
Prosecution acted with bad faith. It, however, confirmed the Prosecution’s subsequent notification of withdrawal of
the charges against Mr. Muthaura. See ICC, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta,
ICC-01/09-02/11-687, Prosecution Notification of Withdrawal of the charges against Francis Kirimi Muthaura (Mar.
11, 2013); ICC, Press Release, Statement by ICC Prosecutor on the Notice to withdraw charges against Mr.
Muthaura (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/OTP-statement-11-03-2013.aspx; ICC,
Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-696, Decision on the
withdrawal of charges against Mr Muthaura (Mar. 18, 2013).
178 Transcript, supra note 13, at 109.
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the Kenyan authorities.179 She did not, however, explain why the OTP needed the consent of the
Kenyan authorities to visit a public radio station that operates independently of the Kenyan
government. Nor did she explain why then they failed to obtain that consent in a case concerning
a radio operator whose main crime was what he allegedly said on the radio. At least up until
confirmation, the OTP did not once suggest that it had actually tried – with or without the
Kenyan government’s authorization – to gather radio transcripts or other tangible evidence which
could corroborate the allegations made by witnesses. This, notwithstanding the Prosecutor’s
continued express position that the Kenyan government is cooperative with the ICC.180
3. Darfur
¶60 The OTP has not set foot in Darfur. It did not go before the arrest warrants against Omar
Al-Bashir, Ahmed Haroun, and Ali Kushayb were issued, nor after Sudan closed its borders to
anyone connected with the ICC following the issue of the warrants.181
¶61 It seems fair to accept that ever since the arrest warrants against these government officials
have been issued, the situation in Sudan has reached a level of insecurity which inhibits ‘on the
ground’ investigation. Death threats have been publicly announced against anyone who
cooperates with the ICC.182
¶62 This has caused problems in the ongoing post confirmation proceedings against Abdallah
Banda and Saleh Jerbo, two opposition rebels. All parties to the proceedings have been refused
entrance into the country. As a result, the defense filed a motion for a temporary stay of
proceedings, arguing that a fair trial of the matter was impossible.183 The defense argued that
179 Id.
180 See ICC, Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, Statement at the Press Conference at the Conclusion of Nairobi Segment of
ICC Prosecutor’s Visit to Kenya, Nairobi, available at http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/news%20and%20highlights/otpstatement251012
(expressing gratitude to the Kenyan government for their cooperation); see also Former Chief Prosecutor Moreno-
Ocampo’s address to the Assembly of States Parties, confirming that the Kenyan government was willing to
cooperate: “I am particularly grateful for the respect and support Kenyan leaders have demonstrated for our
independent role. Since our first meeting, I have been impressed by the commitment of President Kibaki and Prime
Minister Odinga to find solutions to past conflicts.” In his address to the Assembly of States Parties, former chief
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo confirmed that the Kenyan government was willing to cooperate: “I am particularly
grateful for the respect and support Kenyan leaders have demonstrated for our independent role. Since our first
meeting, I have been impressed by the commitment of President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga to find solutions
to past conflicts.” See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Address to the Assembly of States Parties, Ninth Session of the
Assembly of States Parties, Speech, New York, 4 (Dec. 6, 2010). This cooperation is further demonstrated by the
fact that two candidates of the forthcoming presidential elections (Ruto and Kenyatta) have voluntarily attended all
hearings in their respective cases before the ICC. Also, the Kenyan government funded in part the establishment of
the WAKI Commission, discussed supra note 158, which had the task to investigate the post election violence that
occurred at the end of 2007, the beginning of 2008.
181 The OTP conducted four missions in Khartoum and interviewed two senior officials of the government of Sudan,
but did not visit Darfur. See ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05-16, Prosecutor’s Responses to Cassese’s
Observation on Issues Concerning the Protection of Victims and the Preservation of Evidence in the Proceedings on
Darfur Pending before the ICC, ¶ 20 (Sept. 11, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc259764.pdf.
182 See ICC, Prosecutor v. Ahmad Harun & Ali Kushayb, ICC-02/05-01/07-48-Red, “Prosecution Request for a
Finding on the Non-Cooperation of the Government of the Sudan in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Harun
and Ali Kushayb, Pursuant to Article 87 of the Rome Statute,” ¶¶ 33–36 (Apr. 19, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc860985.pdf (quoting Sudanese Director of Intelligence, Salah Gosh’s, announcement on
February 22, 2009 that “anyone who attempts to put up his hands to execute [ICC] plans we will cut off his hands,
head and parts because it is a non-negotiable issue.”) (emphasis added).
183 ICC, Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain & Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, ICC-02/05-03/09-274,
Defence Request for a Temporary Stay of Proceedings, ¶¶ 18–35, 40–47 (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1296602.pdf.
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they could not prepare an effective defense due to the ongoing insecurity in Darfur and their
inability to enter the country.184 In addition, the defense relied on a public and apparently official
death threat against anyone cooperating with the ICC.185 In particular, the motion asserted that
the said death threats resulted in severe restrictions on the ability of the defense to secure
evidence, access documents, and ensure the safety of witnesses even when they are contacted by
telephone.186 The prosecution would evidently suffer from similar restrictions.187
¶63 Recently the Chamber dismissed the defense motion.188 Whilst accepting the assertion that
onsite investigations were impossible, it held that “the Statute does not include an absolute and
an all-encompassing right by the prosecution and the defence to on-site investigations.”189
Accordingly, the Chamber held, it “should not automatically conclude that a trial is unfair, and
stay proceedings as a matter of law, in circumstances where States would not allow defence (or
prosecution) investigations in the field even if, as a result, some potentially relevant evidence
were to become unavailable.”190 Indeed, in the Chamber’s view, “the investigation and
prosecution of the most serious crimes of international concern should not become contingent
upon a States' choice to cooperate or not cooperate with the Court.”191 The Chamber rejected
defense arguments on the ground that it had failed to “properly substantiate” its allegation that
the lack of access to Sudan rendered impossible the securing of certain lines of defence and
exculpatory evidence.192 Instead, the Chamber decided that the case should proceed to trial and
that the defense complaints be dealt with, if need be, during or after the presentation of the
evidence.193
¶64 Given the impossibility of conducting complete and thorough investigations without the
ability to visit the crime scenes,194 it is debatable whether the Chamber took the correct approach.
But the impossibility for either party to visit Sudan is not in dispute.
¶65 However, even before the borders were closed, the OTP position was that the danger—for
investigators and informants—was too great to merit a visit to Sudan.195
¶66 The reasonableness of this position is questionable. In 2006, the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, and the Chairman of the UN Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur, Antonio Cassese, both of whom had experience in Darfur, expressed the view that it
should be possible for the Prosecutor to send investigators to Darfur to conduct investigations
184 Id. ¶¶ 24–35, 44.
185 See Harun & Kushayb, ICC-02/05-01/07-48-Red, Request for Finding on Non-Cooperation, supra note 182, ¶¶
33–36.
186 See Banda & Jerbo, ICC-02/05-03/09-274, Defence Request for Temporary Stay, supra note 183, ¶¶ 8–15.
187 As confirmed by Whiting, Lead Evidence & Discovery, supra note 61, at 230.
188 ICC, Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain & Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, ICC-02/05-03/09-410,
Decision on the Defence Request for a Temporary Stay of Proceedings (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1498141.pdf.
189 Id. ¶ 99.
190 Id. ¶ 100.
191 Id.
192 Id. ¶¶ 102, 108, 110, 112–14.
193 Id. ¶¶ 155–56, 159.
194 Indeed, without visiting the crime scenes, the parties miss the opportunity to meet with the witnesses closest to
the events.
195 See ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05-16, Prosecutor’s Responses to Cassese’s Observation, supra
note 181; see also ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05-21, Prosecutor’s Response to Arbour’s Observations
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Invited in Application of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence (Oct. 19, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc259773.PDF.
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without increasing the risk for witnesses.196 Based on her own experience in the region and as a
former chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR, Arbour acknowledged that “[r]isks can never be
eliminated absolutely” but added that security threats in Sudan were caused more by the ongoing
conflict than by their interaction with human rights investigators, which would be the same for
the ICC.197 The Prosecutor contested this assertion in the strongest terms and did not follow their
advice.198 Events following the issue of arrest warrants have effectively stymied ICC activity in
Sudan, but that is no justification for the failure to conduct effective on-site investigations at a
time when it was, in the view of those with the experience and the information to be able to
judge, perfectly possible.
¶67 This failure to investigate has led to the prosecution’s reliance on statements of witnesses
and informants outside Sudan, as well as third-party evidence, including documents provided by
the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur.199
4. Libya
¶68 On February 15, 2011, the Security Council referred the Libyan situation to the ICC.200
Three months later, on May 16, 2011, without ever visiting the place, the OTP sought arrest
warrants for Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah
Al-Senussi on two counts of crimes against humanity.201 Pre-Trial Chamber I issued the arrest
warrants on June 27, 2011.202 On October 20, 2011, the Gaddafi regime collapsed.203
Proceedings against Gaddafi have been terminated following his death.204 The other two are
currently detained in Libya.205 They are awaiting a decision from the Pre-Trial Chamber as to
whether the two detainees in Libya should be tried in Libya or The Hague.206
196 ICC, Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-19, Observations of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights Invited in Application of Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Oct. 10, 2006), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc259768.PDF; ICC, Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-14, Observations on Issues Concerning the
Protection of Victims and the Preservation of Evidence in the Proceedings on Darfur Pending before the ICC (Aug.
25, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc259762.PDF; see also Antonio Cassese, Is the ICC Still Having
Teething Problems?, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 434 (2006).
197 ICC, Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-19, Observations of UN High Commissioner, supra note 196, ¶¶ 62, 64, 68.
198 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05-16, Prosecutor’s Responses to Cassese’s Observation, supra note
181; ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05-21, Prosecutor’s Response to Arbour’s Observations, supra note
195.
199 ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05-16, Prosecutor’s Responses to Cassese’s Observation, supra note
181 at ¶ 20.
200 U.N. Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1970, S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011), http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d6ce9742.html [hereinafter UNSCR 1970].
201 ICC, Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, ICC-01/11-01/11-1, Decision on the “Prosecutor’s Application
Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-
Senussi,” ¶ 1 (June 27, 2011), http://www.iclklamberg.com/Caselaw/Libya/Gaddafietal/PTCI/1.pdf (citing ICC,
Situation in Libya, ICC-Ol/ll-4-Conf-Exp, Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar
Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, (June 27, 2011)).
202 Id.
203 See, inter alia, Joshua Gleis, Fall of the Gaddafi Regime: A Brief Analysis, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 20, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joshua-gleis/fall-of-the-gaddafi-regim_b_1063041.html.
204 ICC, Prosecutor v. Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi,
ICC-01/11-01/11-28, Decision to Terminate the Case Against Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi (Nov.
22, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1274559.pdf.
205 Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi is detained by the Zintan brigade, an autonomous group acting independently of the
government in Libya. The Zintan has thus far refused to surrender him to the Libyan authorities. See Marie-Louise
Gumuchian, Prisoner of Zintan: Gaddafi Son in Libyan Limbo, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/24/us-libya-saif-idUSTRE81N11J20120224. Al-Senussi was surrendered by
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¶69 While NGOs such as Amnesty International (AI) and HRW entered Libya immediately
after the fall of the Gaddafi regime and the UN Commission of Enquiry already had people on
the ground during the war, the ICC OTP did not move for several weeks.207 On November 2,
2011, the Prosecutor issued a report to the Security Council announcing that the OTP would
benefit from the work of the UN Commission of Inquiry, as well as other institutions including
the National Transitional Council.208 The Prosecutor’s report also states the following:
In the light of changed conditions on the ground, the Office is assessing the
possibility of investigations on the ground. The NTC has committed to full
cooperation in this regard. The Office will undertake all necessary precautions to
ensure that adequate and appropriate protection for victims and witnesses in line
with the Office’s statutory obligations is in place before commencing
investigations on the ground.209
¶70 From the Prosecutor’s next report on Libya, issued on May 16, 2012, it appears that
several investigative missions have been conducted in Libya since November 2, 2011.210
Nonetheless, this report clearly suggests that, at least up until then, the OTP primarily relied on
evidence gathered by other bodies, most notably the UN Commission of Inquiry.211 The OTP’s
own investigation period was short-lived, as it suspended investigations in respect to the two
suspects pending Libya’s admissibility challenge.212 The OTP was required to do so under article
19(7) of the ICC Statute.213
Mauritania to the Libyan authorities in Tripoli on September 5, 2012. See Mauritania Deports Libya Spy Chief
Abdullah al-Senussi, BBC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19487228. This surrender
to Libya, rather than the ICC, has led to controversy. See ICC, Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-
Senussi, ICC-01/11-01/11-204, Request to Submit Observations Pursuant to Regulation 77(4) of the Regulations of
the Court (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1466144.pdf. See also Geoffrey Robertson,
Extradition of Abdullah al-Senussi is a Blow to International Justice, GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/sep/05/extradition-abdullah-al-senussi-justice.
206 It was the Prosecutor who invited the Libyan authorities to challenge the admissibility of the case of Saif Al
Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah al Senussi. See ICC, Prosecutor v. Saif Al Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah al Senussi, ICC-
01/11-01/11-31, Prosecution’s Submissions on the Prosecutor’s Recent Trip to Libya, ¶¶ 7–8, 11–13 (Nov. 25,
2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1276955.pdf.
207 The Prosecutor made his first official mission to Libya on November 22, 2011, following the arrest of Saif
Gaddafi. See id. ¶¶ 2–3. See also ICC, Press Release, ICC-OTP-20111122-PR745, ICC Prosecutor arrives in Libya
(Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20(2011)/pr745.
208 SECOND REPORT OF ICC PROSECUTOR TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO UNSCR 1970, ¶¶ 36, 38–39
(Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/7D520377-EA90-4605-80EF-
E7E111B4C92F/283921/UNSCreportLibyaNov2011ENG1.pdf.
209 Id. ¶ 58.
210 THIRD REPORT OF ICC PROSECUTOR TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO UNSCR 1970, ¶ 11 (May 16,
2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D313B617-6A86-4D64-88AD-
A89375C18FB9/0/UNSCreportLibyaMay2012Eng.pdf.
211 Id. ¶¶ 32–35, 47–58. For instance, in this report, the OTP relies exclusively on the findings of the UN
Commission of Inquiry in determining that it has no information suggesting that NATO was implicated in
committing war crimes. Id. ¶¶ 51–58. Further, the report notes the UN Commission’s finding that Misratan militias
have committed crimes against perceived Gaddafi loyalists including the Tawerghans. Id. ¶¶ 47–50.
212 Id. ¶ 30. This has also been confirmed in the Fourth Report. FOURTH REPORT OF ICC PROSECUTOR TO UN
SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO UNSCR 1970, ¶ 12 (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C88D601E-E112-4E87-A162-
AD530F467E64/285082/UNSCreportLibyaNov2012_english1.pdf.
213 Article 19(7) provides: “If a challenge is made by a State referred to in paragraph 2 (b) or (c), the Prosecutor
shall suspend the investigation until such time as the Court makes a determination in accordance with article 17.”
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¶71 The Prosecutor nonetheless stated that the OTP would continue to investigate gender-based
crimes committed by other possible suspects outside Libya, as identified by the UN Commission
of Inquiry.214 The Prosecutor also mentioned that the OTP was collecting information about “the
activities outside Libya of high-level Gaddafi officials who were allegedly involved in Rome
Statute crimes and who reportedly continue to seek to destabilize the situation of Libya.”215
¶72 The Prosecutor’s Fourth Report, issued in November 2012 says that the Libyan authorities
have generally permitted the OTP to conduct onsite investigations in Libya.216 The Prosecutor
also praised the Libyan authorities for ensuring the security of the OTP while investigating in
Libya.217 The onsite investigations were, however, again interrupted during the detention lasting
26 days of four officers of the Court in Zintan in June 2012.218 During that period, the OTP
“limited its own presence and activities in Libya.”219
¶73 As of September 11, 2012, the Libyan authorities formally renewed their cooperation
commitment to the Court and the OTP resumed its investigations in Libya.220 On November 7,
2012, a year after the OTP commenced its onsite investigations in Libya, the Prosecutor
announced that her office is contemplating bringing a second Libyan case before the ICC but has
not yet decided on the focus of that case.221
¶74 Overall, it is apparent that the OTP made a slow start in conducting effective and
independent investigations in Libya. And even after, the OTP onsite investigations were
suspended in relation to the pending ICC case, and interrupted in relation to other potential ICC
cases. Accordingly, the OTP has had to rely heavily on information collected by third parties.
Even if currently, the OTP relies on its own investigative product, a lot of valuable evidence may
already be lost or destroyed.222
D. Problems in Relying on Third Parties
1. Reliance on UN and NGOs
¶75 The support of third-party organizations, in particular the UN and NGOs, can be helpful
and necessary for a successful criminal investigation. Many of them were present in the area
concerned long before the ICC investigators arrived. These entities tend to have a permanent
presence there, making them generally more familiar with the territory than ICC investigators.
Their assistance can be useful in providing details regarding potential witnesses, documentary or
See ICC Statute, art. 19(7) (Nov. 29, 2010).
214 THIRD REPORT, supra note 210, ¶¶ 32–35. This has also been confirmed in the FOURTH REPORT, supra note 212,
¶¶ 21–23.
215 ICC, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Pursuant to UNSCR 1970, ¶ 14 (May 16, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FAF0EA25-AE2F-445B-A879-D82EDE7E3BAD/284668/OTP16052012Eng.pdf.
216 FOURTH REPORT, supra note 212, ¶ 9.
217 ICC, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in
Libya, Pursuant to UNSCR 1970, ¶ 11 (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/icc%20weekly%20update/Documents/ED150_ENG.pdf.
218 FOURTH REPORT, supra note 212, ¶¶ 9, 22.
219 Id. ¶ 9.
220 Id.
221 Prosecutor Statement on Nov. 7, 2012, supra note 217, ¶ 11.
222 Cassese made a similar observation in relation to the Prosecutor’s failure to visit Darfur in 2006. See Situation in
Darfur, ICC-02/05-14, Observations on Issues Concerning Protection of Victims, supra note 196, at 9–10.
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other evidence.223 They may orient the investigators and bring to their attention the most serious
crimes committed in a particular region. They may even suggest the names of alleged
perpetrators.224
¶76 However, while helpful, this evidence is not looked upon highly, and for good reason.225
Indeed, ICC Judges generally view NGO and UN reports with scepticism. They tend to decline
to admit them into evidence or accredit them little, if any, evidential weight.226
¶77 As illustrated above, the OTP has nonetheless made substantial use of UN and NGO work
product.227 The prosecution has relied on these entities much more than their own investigations.
But these organizations have a very different mandate, and do not apply the standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt.228 Nor do they share the Prosecutor’s obligation to “investigate
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.”229 In addition, the UN and NGOs are
generally reluctant to provide the defense with any material, which increases the gap of resources
between the two parties.230 It is no surprise therefore, that the OTP’s reliance on their
investigations, in lieu of its own, has proved problematic.231
¶78 In addition, UN and NGO fact-finders are not accountable to any judicial body, and no
standardized methods of gathering the information exist, which makes it hard to test the validity
of the research and conclusions.232 This is so particularly when the methodology applied is not
223 See, e.g., Lyal S. Sunga, How Can UN Human Rights Special Procedures Sharpen ICC Fact-Finding?, 15 INT’L
J. HUM. RTS. 2, 188 (2011); HUM. RTS. FIRST, THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS IN RELATION TO ICC
INVESTIGATIONS, at 4–5 (Sept. 2004), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/HRF-NGO_RoleInvestigations_0904.pdf.
224 See, e.g., De Vos, Case Note, supra note 7, at 17; Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, supra note 7, at 142; HUM.
RTS. FIRST, HUM. RTS. NGOS, supra note 223, at 5.
225 See, e.g., ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-3184, Decision on
the Bar Table Motion of the Defence of Germain Katanga, ¶¶ 8, 16–17 (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://www.worldcourts.com/icc/eng/decisions/2011.10.21_Prosecutor_v_Katanga.pdf; ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain
Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-2635, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Bar Table Motions, ¶¶ 14,
28–31 (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.worldcourts.com/icc/eng/decisions/2010.12.17_Prosecutor_v_Katanga.pdf;
Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 150, ¶ 78; Abu
Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, supra note 172, ¶¶ 50–52; ICC, Prosecutor
v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-802, Decision on the Admissibility and Abuse of Process
Challenges, ¶¶ 235, 254–55 (June 24, 2010),
http://www.worldcourts.com/icc/eng/decisions/2010.06.24_Prosecutor_v_Bemba.pdf.
226 In the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Justice Robertson Q.C. said the following, which is rightly on point:
“Courts must guard against allowing prosecutions to present evidence which amounts to no more than hearsay
demonisation of defendants by human rights groups and the media. The right of sources to protection is not a charter
for lazy prosecutors to make a case based on second-hand media reports and human rights publications.” SCSL,
Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara & Santigie Borbor Kanu, SCSL-04-16-AR73-506, Separate
and Concurring Opinion of Hon. Justice Geoffrey Robertson, QC, Decision on Prosecution Appeal Against Decision
on Oral Application for Witness TF1-150 to Testify without Being Compelled to Answer Questions on Grounds of
Confidentiality, ¶ 35 (May 26, 2006), http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=mkkX0rrspuk%3d&tabid=197.
227 See, e.g., Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3184, Decision on Bar Table Motion of Defence of Germain
Katanga, supra note 225.
228 Sunga, How?, supra note 223, at 189–90.
229 ICC Statute, art. 54(1)(a) (Nov. 29, 2010).
230 The author has personally experienced difficulties in securing the cooperation from UN or NGOs, not only in
DRC but also in other countries under investigation. See also Caroline Buisman, Defence and Fair Trial, in
SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A SYSTEM SUI GENERIS 167, 198–205 (Roelof Haveman, Olga Kavran & Julian
Nicholls eds., Intersentia 2003); see also Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, supra note 7, at 145.
231 De Vos, Case Note, supra note 7, at 18; Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, supra note 7, at 145.
232 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The UN and Protection of Human Rights: Appraising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding
Missions, 5 WASH. U. J.L. POL’Y 35, 37 (2001).
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clearly described, which is frequently the case.233 In addition, the fact-finders’ knowledge of
events is often limited, and they are not always neutral.234
¶79 For instance, MONUC played an active role in negotiating and implementing peace
initiatives in DRC.235 In that capacity, it had frequent contact with members of the warring
parties including the suspects and their allies, potentially leading to firm views regarding the
conduct of the defendants.236
¶80 Moreover, the bulk of UN and NGO material constitutes first- or even second-hand
hearsay, or relies on dubious anonymous sources.237 Accordingly, the OTP’s heavy reliance on
UN and NGO investigations clearly diminishes the quality of the investigations and
compromises its independence.238
2. Reliance on Intermediaries
a) Usefulness
¶81 In the view of Christian De Vos, which is shared by this author, “it makes great sense for
the OTP to develop contacts with actors on the ground, given constraints on its time and
resources.”239 They understand the local culture, language and people, which are opaque to
foreign investigators. They ensure that doors open that would otherwise be closed. They are the
bridge between the international staff and the local communities and introduce witnesses to the
investigators. No one suggests that the involvement of a local person, not officially employed by
the ICC, in putting a witness in contact with a party necessarily renders the witness unreliable.
This involvement, in itself, is not problematic and may be beneficial.240
¶82 It can safely be assumed that ICTY and ICTR investigators also worked with local people
acting as liaisons between them and the local communities, even if the practice was never
exposed to the extent it has been at the ICC. These people might not have been referred to as
intermediaries and their activities may have been more ad hoc in nature, but they certainly
played at least a limited role in putting the investigators in contact with potential witnesses.241
¶83 Defense teams also use local people in their search for evidence. Every defense team
deploys local investigators who have connections in the field that they can use to contact
informants or potential witnesses. Sometimes potential witnesses will only cooperate with prior
233 See Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-2635, Decision on Prosecutor’s Bar Table Motions, supra note 225,
¶¶ 28–31 (excluding a large number of proposed UN and NGO reports on the ground that the methodology was
unknown). See also Sunga, How?, supra note 223, at 190 (“human rights fact-finding is usually more general and
less rigorous than fact-finding required for criminal prosecutions”).
234 The lack of neutrality of some NGOs is apparent from their joint letter to the ICC Prosecutor (July 31, 2006),
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/DRC_joint_letter_eng.PDF; see also Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, supra
note 7, at 144–145.
235 U.N., MONUC Mandate http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/mandate.shtml.
236 The author acquired this information as a member of the Katanga defense team.
237 The International Court of Justice in DRC v. Uganda declined to rely on a MONUC report tendered by DRC
government, because of its use of second hand hearsay. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, 2005 ICJ Rep. 116, ¶ 159. See
also Bassiouni, UN & Protection of Human Rights, supra note 232, at 37.
238 Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, supra note 7, at 144–45.
239 De Vos, Case Note, supra note 7, at 17; see also Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, supra note 7, at 144.
240 This is based on the author’s personal experience in collecting evidence.
241 As was acknowledged by former ICTY Prosecutors at the ICC Conference. See ‘The Law and Practice of the
International Criminal Court: Achievements, Impact and Challenges’ Conference, supra note 6.
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approval of the chief of the village, and there is little doubt that that approval is best negotiated
by a local investigator.242
¶84 How is it then that the Prosecutor received such severe criticism from the Court in
Lubanga for relying on intermediaries? Was it fair criticism, or was it indeed “overly harsh,”
based on ex post facto determinations of witnesses’ unreliability and insufficiently considerate of
the realities on the ground?
¶85 The prosecution is not criticized for using intermediaries per se, but for the extent to and
manner in which it did so.
b) The Extent of Intermediary Involvement and the Lack of Supervision
¶86 In Lubanga, Lavigne testified that intermediaries were excluded from the decision-making
process as well as the screening of and interviews with the witnesses, save in exceptional
circumstances.243 The OTP position is that the intermediaries did not play more than “a
supporting role”.244
¶87 It is clear that intermediaries in Lubanga and Katanga & Ngudjolo played much more than
merely supporting roles. They may have been excluded from the official decision-making
process, but they made all of the relevant decisions on the ground. It was the intermediaries who
travelled to locations, collected information, identified witnesses and established what they had
to say.245 In essence, intermediaries shaped (and tainted) the evidence before it ever reached
prosecution investigators.246 Intermediaries conducted their activities practically in lieu of the
investigators officially employed by the OTP.247
¶88 The official investigators rarely visited the region where the investigations were
conducted. On the rare occasions that they did, their movements were restricted for reason
explained above.248 No process for verifying the credibility of the witnesses introduced by
intermediaries was spoken of by Lavigne. On the contrary, investigators were instructed to stay
away from any location where, or person through whom, such verifications could have taken
place.249 The intermediaries carried out their activities mostly without supervision or direction.250
The Katanga defense has pointed at the “systematic dangers” inherent to this process in which
extensive unsupervised contact between intermediaries and potential witnesses was routine.251
242 At least, this is the case in the author’s experience.
243 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 181 (citing Prosecution’s Confidential Filing, supra
note 9, ¶ 17).
244 Id. ¶ 182 (citing Prosecution’s Confidential Filing, supra note 9, ¶ 38).
245 Supra, Part II (Problems in Investigations), sections A.1 (The Prosecutor’s Solution: Reliance on Third Parties);
A.3 (Problems with Intermediaries); B.2 (Reliance on Intermediaries).
246 Id.
247 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 482.
248 See, e.g., supra notes 27–46, 115–117.
249 See supra notes 39, 40.
250 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 482.
251 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶ 463.
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c) Lack of Scrutiny of Intermediaries
¶89 One criticism of the Lubanga Chamber was that the OTP did not scrutinize the background
of the persons it employed as intermediaries.252 It is clear from Lavigne’s testimony that there
were indeed no proper checks on the backgrounds of the intermediaries.253 Lavigne and Sebire
testified that anyone who claimed not to have been involved in the conflict or to have committed
crimes was potentially able to become an intermediary.254 Lavigne also indicated that OTP
investigators were particularly interested in persons who claimed to have experience in human
rights work.255 A number of individuals approached the OTP, rather than the other way round
and became intermediaries by offering to identify potential witnesses.256 There was no formal
recruitment procedure and no contracts were signed until much later.257
¶90 Both Lavigne and the chief of investigations in Katanga & Ngudjolo testified that OTP
investigators tried to ascertain the reliability of the intermediaries through background checks.258
They, however, claimed that this was difficult because the information available to them was
limited.259 Seeking to find out more about their backgrounds could expose these intermediaries
and increase the risks they encountered in the field.260 Lavigne testified that the protection of
intermediaries was a primary constraint in carrying out any such checks.261
¶91 As has been seen above, the OTP was prepared to rely heavily on intermediaries whose
credibility was seriously contested by its own investigators.262 Nothing suggests that more
careful testing of the evidence gathered by these intermediaries was instigated as a result. It is
evident from the testimony of Lavigne about intermediary P-316 (see above) that the OTP was in
a bind and prepared to overlook almost any evidence of falsehood and wrongdoing on the part of
intermediaries, clinging to the fig-leaf that, whatever might be said about the intermediaries
themselves, there was no reason to doubt the word of the witnesses they had introduced.263 The
trial process demonstrated how empty that theory was.264 In truth, the OTP had, as the Chamber
commented, “delegated its investigative responsibilities to the intermediaries.”265 There was no
going back, without starting again from scratch.
252 See, e.g., Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, at ¶ 368.
253 Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 53, 55 (Nov. 16, 2010),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1298128.pdf.
254 Id. at 53.
255 Id. at 49–51.
256 Id. at 49–50.
257 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶¶ 190–95 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-
01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 49–53).
258 Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 55; Katanga & Ngudjolo
Trial Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG, supra note 106, at 37–38.
259 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶¶ 196–97 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-
01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 52–55); Katanga & Ngudjolo Trial Hearing, ICC-01/04-
01/07-T-81-Red-ENG, supra note 106, at 37–38.
260 Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 54.
261 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 196 (citing id.).
262 Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24.
263 See, e.g., Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3251-Corr-Red, Corrigendum du Mémoire Final, supra note
112, ¶¶ 18–25; ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-338-Red-ENG,
Closing Statements, 32 (May 21, 2012), http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1423314.pdf; Katanga & Ngudjolo,
ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief, supra note 105, ¶ 463.
264 See Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶ 463.
265 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 482.
Vol. 11:3] Dr. Caroline Buisman
59
d) Non-Transparent Nature of Relationship
¶92 The nature of the relationship between the OTP and the intermediaries in the Lubanga and
Katanga & Ngudjolo cases was not transparent. For years, despite many requests from the
defense for disclosure, the identities of the intermediaries were withheld from the defense and
the public at large.266 Some of them still remain anonymous.267 The Chamber’s order to disclose
the identity of a number of intermediaries only came once the evidence had put their credibility
in question.268 On one occasion the OTP refused to obey the Chamber’s order to disclose the
identity of P-143 to the defense because of security concerns.269 Not surprisingly, the Chamber
then stayed the proceedings, holding that there could not be a fair trial if the Prosecutor refused
to follow the court’s orders.270 The Appeals Chamber overturned this decision finding that
alternative, less drastic, measures could have been implemented to rectify the situation, such as
sanctions on the prosecution.271 It was long after the Katanga defense had discovered the identity
of P-143 that the OTP disclosed his identity.272
¶93 This policy of non-disclosure to the defense of intermediaries’ identities meant that, for the
majority of trial, no questions could be asked which might lead to the identification of the
intermediaries.273 This policy significantly hampered the defense’s ability to challenge the
credibility and reliability of these intermediaries, and, in turn, the effect any diminished
reliability or credibility may have had on the truth of the evidence from witnesses these
intermediaries introduced.274
¶94 Moreover, the terms of the contracts between the OTP and the intermediaries, and their job
descriptions, if any, remain withheld from the defense and the public.275 The amount they have
been paid is unknown.276 The ICC Director of Courtroom Services testified in the Katanga &
Ngudjolo case that “[t]he same intermediary may be used by five different units of the Court”;
and that the OTP “may enter into confidential agreements with an intermediary… Nothing
266 See, e.g., ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-312-ENG, Public Submissions and
Decision, 15–22 (July 7, 2010); Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-Red2, Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, supra
note 23, at ¶¶ 5, 6, 15–16, 34, 50, 56, 66–74, 81, 85–87, 112, 115 (May 31, 2010); Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-
01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief, supra note 105, ¶ 473, n. 609.
267 For instance, the identity of intermediary P-310 in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case has not been disclosed to the
defense. In Lubanga, the defense is still unaware of the identities of intermediaries 81, 123, 154, 254 and 290. See
Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-Red2, Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, supra note 23, at ¶¶ 139, 145.
268 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-Red2, Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, supra note 23, at ¶¶ 5, 6, 138–39,
150.
269 Id. ¶ 143; ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2517-Red, Public Redacted Decision on
the Prosecution’s Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or
Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU, ¶¶ 2–17 (July 8, 2010).
270 Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2517-Red, Public Redacted Decision, supra note 269, at ¶ 31.
271 ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2582, Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent
Request for Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay
Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU, ¶¶ 45–61 (Oct. 8, 2010).
272 The defense had obtained this information in the field before the commencement of trial. On September 13,
2010, almost a year after the start of the trial (November 24, 2009) and over three months after the Chamber ordered
it to do so (June 7, 2010), the OTP finally disclosed P-143’s identity to the defense by email.
273 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶ 474.
274 For instance, the defence could not put P-143’s name to any of the prosecution witnesses who testified before the
disclosure of his identity.
275 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶ 476.
276 Id.
NORT HWE S T E RN JOURNAL O F INT E RNAT IONAL HUM AN RI GH T S [ 2 0 1 3
60
governs the amount that is provided to these intermediaries. One might think that it would be
between 30 and 60 dollars per day, but nothing would keep a unit from paying more or less.
Furthermore, the Registry is in no way able to determine what the OTP may have paid an
intermediary or what all the five various units have paid to an intermediary. There is no
requirement through the agreements or through the arrangements made to disclose. That can be
criticised, of course.”277
¶95 In addition to their fees, intermediaries are reimbursed for relevant expenses. The evidence
shows that both P-316 and P-143 were seeking to maximize this income.278 As early as 2008,
prosecution investigators believed that both P-316 and P-143 were inventing financial claims.279
Seemingly, P-316’s motive for inventing threats to his safety (see above) was to get more
economic or other support as well as relocation.280 The financial benefits from relocation are
considerable: the Court provides a relocated person with free housing, health care, living
expenses, security monitoring and education—often for his entire family—in their new
location.281 Notwithstanding the scepticism as to the veracity of P-316’s security concerns, both
he and his assistant P-183 (whom P-316 had claimed at one stage had been killed) are currently
relocated by the Court as a protective measure.282
¶96 P-143 has also been relocated.283 The reason that the Prosecutor disobeyed the Chamber’s
order to disclose P-143’s identity to the defense was that negotiations were still ongoing
regarding his protective measures. P-143 delayed the implementation of the protective measures
to obtain more protection and to delay the disclosure of his identity.284
¶97 In light of these circumstances, it does not come as a surprise that both the Lubanga and
Katanga defense teams have alleged that the intermediaries have a strong monetary incentive to
find potential witnesses of alleged crimes and that this may lead them to encourage witnesses to
lie.285
e) Financial Interests of Witnesses
¶98 There is also a benefit to witnesses in giving (false) testimony. Many of them are
relocated.286 This is a life changing experience for individuals from eastern DRC.287 It is not
surprising that suggestions have been made that the prospect of relocation undermines the
credibility and reliability of witnesses.288 The Lubanga Chamber, however, held that “[t]he fact
277 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-180-Red-ENG WT, Trial
Hearing, 8-9 (Aug. 8, 2010).
278 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 289, 371 citing EVD-D01-01086 and EVD-D01-
01004.
279 Id.
280 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶¶ 503–04.
281 Id. ¶ 505.
282 Id. ¶¶ 484, 504.
283 Id. ¶ 500.
284 Id.
285 Id. ¶ 476.
286 Id. ¶¶ 507–08.
287 Id. ¶¶ 505–09.
288 Id. ¶¶ 505–11; ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2773-Red-tENG, Closing
Submissions of the Defence, ¶ 54 (July 15, 2011).
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that a witness is in the ICC protection program does not, without more, undermine his or her
credibility.”289
¶99 But there is more. A number of witnesses in the Lubanga and Katanga & Ngudjolo cases
alleged that part of their motive for giving false statements and testimony was that the
intermediary promised them money, education and free re-housing.290 For instance, relocated
witness P-28 stated in the Katanga & Ngudjolo trial:
I will say this gentleman raised my hopes. He said this was something very
confidential and that no one would get to know about it. That is what he said.
However, nothing was made up with respect to the events that took place in
Bogoro. I do confirm that with respect to that statement, the statement about
schooling was made up by number 14. No, it is false.291
¶100 Thus, it appears that P-28 lied to the prosecution to be protected, in other words relocated,
and that he was reassured by the promise that nobody would hear about it. It also appears that P-
28 made international relocation a condition for testifying, a demand that was ultimately granted
notwithstanding VWU’s assessment at the time that international relocation was unnecessary.292
¶101 P-279, another relocated witness in the Katanga & Ngudjolo trial, testified that
intermediary P-143 had told him that he would benefit from protective measures if he gave a
statement to the prosecution.293 Defense witnesses D2-146 and D2-147 testified that P-143
informed them that P-279 and P-280 were going to study,294 and that it was P-143’s business to
go around picking up children to enrol them into a white man’s study program somewhere.295 It
is noteworthy that the Chamber did not consider either of these witnesses credible.296
¶102 Lavigne acknowledged that word spread in Bunia that a witness whose safety was at risk
could be relocated, and that this was considered by some individuals as an opportunity to secure
free re-housing.297 In this regard, it is noteworthy that eight of the twelve relocated witnesses in
the Katanga & Ngudjolo case were in contact with P-143 or P-316.298 Relocation was
undoubtedly one of the tools that contributed significantly to the emerging culture of corruption
of the evidence in Ituri.
¶103 In sum, the severe but well-deserved criticism from the judges was based, not on the use of
intermediaries per se, but on a succession of failures in conducting the investigations, most
importantly the lack of supervision by the OTP over the activities of the intermediaries.
289 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 347.
290 Id. ¶ 293; Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-Red2, Redacted Decision on Intermediaries, supra note 23, at ¶ 140.
291 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-221-Red-ENG WT, Trial
Hearing, 39–40 (Nov. 23, 2010).
292 P-28’s request for international relocation was granted after a lengthy postponement of his testimony as a result
of his persistent refusal to give evidence without the granting of his request. See Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-
01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief, supra note 105, ¶¶ 509–10.
293 Id. ¶ 487.
294 Id. ¶ 488, 492 (citing confidential pages 49–50 of transcript ICC-01/04-01/07-T-261-Red-ENG (May 17, 2011)
and public page 45 of transcript ICC-01/04-01/07-T-264-Red-ENG (May 20, 2011)).
295 Id. ¶ 492 (citing public page 45 of transcript ICC-01/04-01/07-T-264-Red-ENG (May 20, 2011)).
296See Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-02/12-3, supra note 18, ¶¶ 189–90, 218–19.
297 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 147 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-
Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 41).
298 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶ 479.




¶104 The Prosecutor’s duties are described in article 54 of the Rome Statute. The relevant
passages require him/her to “…establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover all facts and
evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under this Statute,
and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating evidence equally” and “[t]ake
appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court ….”299 In carrying out these investigations, the Prosecutor must respect
“the interests and personal circumstances of victims and witnesses…[and] …the rights of
persons arising under this Statute”.300
¶105 Some might say that this sets too high of a standard.301 ICC Judge Kaul was apparently not
of that view when he described these obligations as “fundamental requirements which set out
clear, if not high standards for proper investigations carried out by the Prosecutor on behalf of
the Court.”302
¶106 No trial can be run effectively without proper investigations having preceded it. Adequate
investigations ensure that only the best quality evidence is produced before the Court and that the
credibility of the Prosecutor’s own witnesses is adequately tested. It also provides the Prosecutor
with material to cross-examine defense witnesses and undermine their credibility where
appropriate. Without adequate investigations, the ICC cannot achieve any of the goals it has set
out to achieve and deliver “meaningful justice.”303 As HRW put it, “the Office of the
Prosecutor’s investigations and prosecutions are the peg upon which the rest of the court’s work
must hang.”304
¶107 Alongside these duties, article 54 of the Rome Statute also provides the Prosecutor with the
power to “[t]ake necessary measures, or request that necessary measures be taken, to ensure the
confidentiality of information, the protection of any person or the preservation of evidence.”305
Witness protection is clearly important. If there is a genuine risk that witnesses will be
intimidated or harmed, this risk will significantly affect the fairness of any trial, and the failure to
combat such risks will have a chilling effect upon the willingness of any witnesses to come
forward in the future. On the other hand witness protection measures (particularly anonymity)
can conflict with the rights of the defense and, where the measures are life changing in their
nature, unbalance the evidential picture and be the cause of injustice. A balance may be difficult
to strike.
¶108 Thus far in the life of the ICC, the OTP has failed to strike a proper balance, placing far too
much emphasis on protective measures and too little on conducting efficient investigations. In a
number of cases, the overemphasis on protective measures has done more harm than good.
299 ICC Statute, art. 54(1)(a)–(b).
300 ICC Statute, art. 54(1)(b)–(c).
301 Lavigne considered that the Court expected unrealistically high investigation standards from the OTP, which did
not correspond with the reality in the field and which could infringe on witness protection. Lubanga Judgment, ICC-
01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 196 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG,
supra note 24, at 54).
302 ICC-01/09-02/11-373-Red, Judge Kaul Dissenting Opinion, supra note 175, at ¶ 46 (emphasis added).
303 Closing Gaps in the Selection of ICC Cases 46, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (Sept. 2011),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/icc0911webwcover.pdf.
304 Id.
305 ICC Statute, art. 54(3)(f) (Nov. 29, 2010).
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¶109 The suggestion that the OTP has not struck a proper balance is based on two propositions.
First, that the security situation in a number of the locations in which the ICC operates is far less
inhibiting than the OTP claims. Second, that even if the security concerns were entirely genuine,
they would not justify the Prosecution’s solution of outsourcing the bulk of its investigations to
third parties, thereby undermining the OTP’s efficiency and neutrality.
B. Security Concerns: Genuine or Exaggerated?
¶110 At a recent conference on the law and practice of the ICC,306 it was suggested that the OTP
was risk-averse in conducting investigations.307 The ICC representative conceded that the OTP,
though not risk-averse, was cautious. But with good cause, he claimed, because the OTP has to
deal with genuine security issues on a regular basis.308
¶111 It seems indeed indisputable that some level of caution in conducting investigations is
appropriate and necessary. Particularly when the government of a state in which the OTP would
wish to carry out investigations is hostile towards the ICC, the safety of the ICC personnel and
potential witnesses is genuinely in question. This is so because the ICC relies on the state
authorities to offer protection to Court employees as well as anyone assisting the Court.309 The
author nonetheless suggests that the OTP’s approach to date has been an overly cautious
approach, resulting in significant gaps in the investigations.
1. Security of Prosecution Personnel
¶112 As has been addressed above, ever since the public announcements of the arrest warrants
of government members of Sudan, nobody associated with the ICC has been able to enter the
country. Even if they could, it would be unwise, even irresponsible, to do so in light of the death
threats that have been announced against anyone who cooperates with the ICC.310
¶113 Although not to the same extent as Sudan, the security situation in Libya is also genuinely
volatile.311 Security risks for OTP personnel were particularly serious while the war was still
going on. But also after the end of the war, the security situation in Libya has remained
unpredictable. This is evidenced by the recent detention lasting several weeks of four officers of
the Court who were in Libya to visit Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, one of those officers being Saif’s
counsel in proceedings before the ICC.312 Recently, there have also been fatal attacks on the US
ambassador and others from the US consulate in Benghazi.313 Though unrelated to the ICC
proceedings, this incident may add to the overall perception of lack of security in Libya, which
may undermine the ability to conduct investigations on the ground. It does not help that the
306 ICC Conference, supra note 6.
307 This suggestion was made by Joseph Powderly, Assistant Professor of Public International Law at the Grotius
Centre for International Legal Studies, The Hague.
308 Observations of Alex Whiting, OTP Prosecution Coordinator, at ICC Conference, supra note 6.
309 See section III.D (A Comparison with the ad-hoc Tribunals).
310 Supra notes 178–82.
311 See supra, sections II.C.3 (Darfur) and II.C.4 (Libya).
312 They were arrested on June 7, 2012 and detained until July 2, 2012 while visiting Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi in prison
in Zintan as part of a privileged visit by the ICC Office of the Public Counsel for the Defence, currently appointed to
represent him in the pending ICC case against him. See ICC-CPI-20120702-PR821, The Four ICC Staff Members,
Released Today, Have Left Tripoli (July 2, 2012), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/CBD6C497-C5CB-
470B-A443-06B04218DA80.htm.
313 Matt Spetalnick & Hadeel Al Shalchi, Obama Vows to Track Down Ambassador’s Killers, REUTERS (Sept. 12,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/12/us-libya-usa-attack-idUSBRE88B0EI20120912.
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Libyan government is not in control of large parts of the country.314 The level of insecurity in
post-war Libya has not, however, reached that in Sudan to date. Nor does the OTP suggest it has.
In fact, the OTP reports that it enjoys good cooperation from the Libyan government and other
actors on the ground.315 Thus, at present, security concerns do not form an obstacle to conducting
onsite investigations.
¶114 In the Kivu provinces in east DRC, the security situation has drastically deteriorated since
the beginning of the conflict in North Kivu in April 2012.316 However, before the
commencement of the war, there appears to have been no compelling reason to avoid conducting
onsite investigations in this region.317
¶115 As to the DRC, the author is in a position to speak from personal experience over the
course of four and a half years, having spoken to approximately 250 persons of different ethnic
origins and positions living particularly in the eastern part of the country. Both the UN and the
ICC security department consider the situation in Ituri to be volatile varying between UN
Security Phase III and IV.318 Travels to Security Phases III and IV areas are subject to security
restrictions and Phase IV requires prior authorization from the Registrar.319 Travelling around
Ituri is thus not risk-free. There still is an active militia in the area, although the militiamen are
mostly fighting with the Congolese army and reside in remote forest areas. From time to time,
the militia appears on the forefront and launches small attacks, mostly around Aveba, Katanga’s
hometown, interrupting travel plans to that particular area, which is remote from Bunia.320 More
often than not, however, one can travel around notwithstanding the perceived security risks.
¶116 Both the Lubanga and Katanga defense teams traveled around and visited all the relevant
villages, including those in far remote areas, on numerous occasions without insurmountable
difficulties.321 On one occasion there was an incident in Aveba, very close to the location where
members of Katanga’s defense team were interviewing people.322 Apart from some other minor
safety difficulties,323 the investigative missions were conducted in a relatively smooth fashion.
When the need arises, the UN is prepared to offer security items, such as radios, protective
outfits, tanks and escorts. The ICC itself offers bulletproof cars on missions.324
¶117 One cannot automatically conclude that, because the defense was in a position to travel
around Ituri without placing anyone’s safety at excessive risk, the prosecution would have been
314 See, e.g., Dario Cristiani, Hot Issue – The Zintan Militia and the Fragmented Libyan State, JAMESTOWN
FOUNDATION (Jan. 19, 2012, 11:00 AM),
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38899.
315 THIRD REPORT, supra note 210, ¶¶ 10–12; FOURTH REPORT, supra note 201, ¶ 9.
316 Supra note 147.
317 See supra notes 151, 152.
318 See, for instance, ICC Security Briefing DRC (Oct. 17, 2008), (internal ICC document, on file with the author).
319 See, for instance, ICC Security Updates DRC (Nov. 20, 2008; Apr. 8, 2009; May 6, 2009; July 16, 2009; Oct. 14,
2009) (internal ICC documents, on file with the author).
320 By car, it takes approximately 4 to 5 hours to reach Aveba from Bunia.
321 At times, it is difficult to visit any place outside Bogoro, and particularly Aveba. At such times, missions are not
approved. However, more often than not it was considered safe enough to travel around in Ituri.
322 Germain Katanga made reference to this incident in his final address to the Chamber. See ICC, Prosecutor v.
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-340-ENG, Closing Statements, 50 (May 23,
2012).
323 On a few occasions, the Katanga defense team had to negotiate with drunk soldiers from the Congolese army
who were manning roadblocks on the way to Aveba. In addition, the Katanga defense encountered difficulties with
the community of the co-accused.
324 This is based on the author’s personal experience in conducting investigations. While traveling with UN escorts
is undoubtedly safer, it can undermine the efficiency of the investigations, as people are less inclined to trust you
and speak with you freely if you arrive with UN tanks.
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able to do the same. After all, the prosecution is the one going after people allegedly with power
and influence in this region. In particular, the areas in Ituri where the defendants had their
strongholds—in this case in and around the villages of Zumbe and Aveba325—might be more
accessible to the defense than to the prosecution.
¶118 But differential treatment between the defense and prosecution should not be
overestimated. As Lavigne himself pointed out in regard to the DRC, many people hardly make a
distinction between different branches of the ICC.326 And it is not just in the DRC that many
people would be hard pressed to explain the functioning of the court or to distinguish between
the roles of prosecution and defense.327
¶119 Also, in many situations, it is the reverse. Where the defendant is an opponent of the
government, the defense has little chance of counting on the cooperation of the government.328
This has been an issue in the DRC for all defendants.329 Even if the local populations in some of
the investigation areas are more welcoming to the defense than to the prosecution, the defense
still has to face the Congolese army which is present all around these areas.330 The defense also
has to travel through areas where other defendants have their strongholds. Defendants and/or
their allies do not always cooperate with each other, particularly where they supported opposite
sides during the conflict or where their interests clash.331
¶120 In any event, there is only one way of testing the level of cooperation of local
communities, and that is by visiting their places. This is precisely what the OTP failed to do in
most instances.
325 Zumbe, which is located in the Bedu-Ezekele grouping in the Djugu territory, north of Bunia, is the home base of
Mathieu Ngudjolo. This area is predominantly inhabited by people of the Lendu-Tatsi ethnic group. See, e.g.,
International Crisis Group, Congo: Four Priorities for Sustainable Peace in Ituri, Africa Report N°140 – 13 May
2008, 27, 32, 25 (May 13, 2008), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-
congo/Congo%20Four%20Priorities%20for%20Sustainable%20Peace%20in%20Ituri. Aveba, which is located in
the Walendu-Bindi Collectivity, south of Bunia, is the home base of Germain Katanga. The Walendu-Bindi
Collectivity is largely inhabited by people of the Ngiti ethnic group. See, e.g., Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-
01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief, supra note 105, ¶ 550, n. 720. See also
Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3251-Corr-Red, Corrigendum du Mémoire Final, supra note 112, ¶ 2.
326 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 154 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-
Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 37–38).
327 The author has often been perceived as working for the prosecution. For instance, during a visit to Parliament in
Nairobi before the names of the suspects were announced, a Minister walked in and asked, “Did you come to arrest
me?”
328 The author has personally experienced numerous difficulties in this regard inter alia in DRC. See further Mischa
Wladimiroff, Position of the Defence: The Role of Defence Counsel before the ICTY and the ICTR, in An
Independent Defence before the International Criminal Court 39-40 (H. Bevers & C. Joubert eds., 2000), where the
author, a defence attorney with experience in the ICTY and the ICTR, speaks about his own difficulties in obtaining
evidence in the Tadić case at the ICTY, and the Musema case at the ICTR without the cooperation of the state.
329 For instance, members of the Katanga defense team, including this author, were refused access to potential
defence witnesses detained in the Kinshasa central prison. This refusal lasted two weeks and was repeated on a
subsequent mission. The defense raised this before the Trial Chamber: ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-56-ENG, 49-51 (Feb. 3, 2009). See also, ICC-01/04-01/07-2709-Red,
Katanga Defence Request for Leave to Meet Four Defence Witnesses in The Hague Prior to Their Testimony, (Feb.
17, 2001); ICC-01/04-01/07-2755-Red, Décision sur la requête de la Défense de Germain Katanga aux fins d’être
autorisée à rencontrer des témoins à La Haye (article 64-6-f du Statut), (Mar. 4, 2011).
330 The author has personal experience in entering into difficulties with the Congolese army. As noted above, supra
note 323, on a number of occasions, the author had to negotiate with drunk soldiers manning roadblocks on the way
to her destination.
331 The author has personally faced difficulties in areas where other defendants had their stronghold. Most notably,
dealings with the community of the co-accused were challenging at times.
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¶121 Assuming it is even true that the defense investigators would benefit from greater
cooperation from the local communities in places such as Zumbe and Aveba than OTP
investigators, this does not mean that the latter had no access to these areas at all. The
Prosecutor’s personal visit to Zumbe, Ngudjolo’s militia base on July 10, 2009 is elucidating in
this regard. He arrived by UN helicopter and was well received. The entire visit was videotaped
and watched in the course of the Katanga & Ngudjolo trial, and a picture of Ocampo’s arrival in
Zumbe is hanging in the ICC building.332 The purpose of his visit was to listen to the views and
sufferings of the local Zumbe communities, not to investigate.333 The local authorities were
content that he had made the effort to arrive at Zumbe.334 If the Prosecutor himself was
welcomed with open arms, why would the OTP investigators not be?
¶122 In addition, on January 18, 2012, in the course of the first judicial site visit of the Court,
representatives of the Registry, defense, victims, prosecution and the judges all visited Zumbe,
Aveba and Bogoro without difficulty.335 Prior to this visit, members of the Registry had visited
the areas in question to arrange logistics and to assess the security situation. In doing so, they did
not have particular difficulties and were well received, which further demonstrates that these
areas were not only accessible to members of defense teams.336
¶123 The judicial site visit shows two things. First, security likely was not a good reason for not
going to Zumbe and Aveba. Second, the fact that judges deemed these locations to be of such
importance that they wished to see them with their own eyes makes the prosecution’s failure to
visit these sites during their investigations incomprehensible.
¶124 If any counterarguments can still be made by the Prosecution in respect to accessibility of
the Zumbe and Aveba areas, the same cannot be made in respect to Bogoro. The village of
Bogoro is at the heart of the Katanga & Ngudjolo case and the crimes charged are alleged to
have been committed there.337 It seems inexplicable that the defense teams have visited this
location far more frequently than the OTP. There would not have been a grave risk to visit
Bogoro, which is geographically much closer to Bunia than the other villages (45 minutes by car)
and in a better-secured area with a MONUC base at the edge of the village. So the risk of getting
there is significantly lower.338 Outside Bunia, Bogoro is probably the most-visited village by
members of the ICC, in particular the Registry. The inhabitants are thus fully accustomed to
receiving ICC visits.339 Potential witnesses are able speak to the OTP without fearing revenge
332 This picture can be viewed when entering the public audience of Courtroom I.
333 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3124, DRC-OTP-1063-0002, EVD-D03-00101, EVD-D03-00102 (Prosecution Video
about Ocampo visit to Zumbe, July 10, 2009).
334 This is based on personal interviews in the field with the representatives of the communities who had attended
the meeting with Ocampo. They produced a document listing the concerns they had addressed with the Prosecution
(document on file with the author). In general, the people were content that he had come to listen to their views and
observations.
335 ICC, Press Release, ICC judges in case against Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui visit Ituri, ICC-CPI-20120127-
PR765 (Jan. 27, 2012). The author personally participated in this judicial site visit.
336 Registry’s communication to participants of the judicial site visit. The Chamber was persuaded that security
concerns should not have prevented the OTP from visiting Aveba and Zumbe. See Ngudjolo Judgment, ICC-01/04-
02/12-3, supra note 18, ¶ 118.
337 Between 2008 and 2012, the author participated in multiple defense missions to Bogoro, Aveba, Zumbe and
other villages in Ituri.
338 Indeed, it is rare that missions to Bogoro are cancelled due to security concerns. The more insecure route is
between Bogoro and Aveba. ICC personnel are often required to travel with escorts and tanks on the Bogoro-Aveba
road, but not on the Bunia-Bogoro road.
339 This is based on the author’s personal experience and observation in Bogoro, as well as her communication with
Bogoro villagers.
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from other villagers. The villagers of Bogoro, being the victims of the alleged crimes, have no
complaint at the prospect of the perpetrators being prosecuted. Thus, it can be fairly concluded
that the OTP investigators’ unwillingness to visit Bogoro more frequently suggests
misjudgement of the security situation, which presence on the ground would quickly have
dispelled.
¶125 It may well be that in past years the situation was much more delicate. The author’s
experience does not pre-date 2008, but as Lavigne himself conceded, the situation has improved
significantly over the years, particularly since the establishment of the ICC compound.340 With
good security and Internet facilities, it should have been a convenient place for an OTP
investigator to stay long-term. Yet, even as the security situation improved and the compound
was built, OTP investigators did not alter their ways. In fact, their presence in the region was
increasingly sporadic.341 While in 2006, the OTP reported that it had carried out seventy
missions in and outside the DRC since July 2004,342 significantly fewer missions were carried
out in the following years.343 The most likely explanation is that the focus turned to other
situations under investigation of the ICC. This is regrettable because ample work in east DRC
has been left unfinished.344
2. Security of Persons Assisting the Prosecution
¶126 Understandably, the Prosecutor’s principal concern is the safety of their witnesses. To
protect witnesses adequately, the Court can impose a range of protective measures, varying from
non-disclosure of their identity to the defense and/or the public at large, to relocation.345 This
protective measures scheme is a benefit the Court has over other fact-finding bodies and makes
informants and potential witnesses less reluctant to cooperate.346
¶127 There is, however, a counter-side to the implementation of protective measures. It has
already been noted that the security threat to potential witnesses and intermediaries can be
exaggerated or invented in the hope of extracting economic benefits, most notably relocation.347
340 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 165 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-
Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 75).
341 See supra notes 107–14.
342 ICC, OTP, REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES PERFORMED DURING THE FIRST THREE YEARS, 11 (June 2003–June
2006), (Sept. 12, 2006), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/3YearReport%20_06Sep14.pdf.
343 See supra notes 107–14.
344 HRW, supra note 303, at 1–2, 8, 47 (“In our view, the most pressing needs remain in the DRC, and we urge the
prosecutor to look first at his strategy for continuing the Ituri investigations and ensuring investigation of all armed
groups responsible for crimes committed in the Kivus”). The more situations the OTP takes on, the more likely it
will “do less and less in each situation to square demand with limited resources”. However, “the opposite is
required—more investigations and prosecutions are needed in each of these situations in order to deliver on the
court’s mandate.” Id. at 1–2. See also Gregory Townsend, Structure and Management, in INTERNATIONAL
PROSECUTORS 292–93 (L. Reydams, J. Wouters & C. Ryngaert eds., 2012).
345 See ICC Statute, art. 43(6), 68 (1)–(2) (Nov. 29, 2010); ICC RPE, Rules 87–88 (Sep. 10, 2002); Regulations of
the Registry Regulations 92–96.
346 See, e.g., P-28 affirming in the Katanga & Ngudjolo trial that the promise that “no one would get to know about
it” and that his identity would not be disclosed to the public convinced him to come forward with his story. See P-
28-T-221, at 39–40; P-28-T-223, at 8–10 (FRA-p.7-l.27-28-p.8-l.1-20). See also Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-
01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief, supra note 105, ¶¶ 482–83.
347 See above. Another notable example is the false allegation of witness P-219 that during a telephone conversation
with Katanga from the ICC prison, the latter had begged him to give false testimony in Katanga’s defense before the
ICC and that Katanga cried. Fortunately for Katanga, the said conversation was registered. It turned out that Katanga
never asked him to give false testimony or cried. P-219’s motivation for making up his allegation is not clear, but
could well have been to receive greater protection for himself and his family. See Ngudjolo, supra note 18, at ¶ 280.
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This might then color the real security situation on the ground, which is difficult to assess for
judges far remote.
¶128 Because relocation is the last resort in the Court’s overall protection scheme, it should be
used only in the most exceptional circumstances where no other protective measures are
available which can achieve the same result.348 But in reality, resort to this measure has become
the rule rather than the exception. Is this because there is a genuine need for protection or rather
for an improvement of the economic status of the witnesses and intermediaries concerned? This
section looks at this question in greater detail.
¶129 To be considered for relocation, it is necessary to demonstrate that, as a result of a person’s
cooperation with the Court, the “concrete likelihood” exists that the person would be threatened
if he or she continued to reside in the region.349 Intermediary P-316 was particularly persistent in
making up stories alleging his and other people’s lives were endangered.350 Ironically, the
Prosecution relied on P-316 for information about the security situation in Ituri.351 It is no
wonder, then, that the Prosecution’s assessment of the dangers in that area often differed
drastically from that of others, including the VWU.352
¶130 ICC relocation has run rampant. In the Katanga & Ngudjolo confirmation proceedings, the
Pre-Trial Chamber referred to the number of relocated prosecution witnesses as
“unprecedented.”353 In total, twelve prosecution witnesses were relocated in that case alone.354 In
Lubanga, the number of relocated witnesses was also very high.355 And in Kenya I and II, every
single prosecution witness relied upon in the confirmation proceeding has been relocated to a
third country.356
¶131 A number of these witnesses were relocated against the advice of the VWU,357 even though
the VWU has the authority and expertise to decide on matters of relocation and other protective
measures for witnesses at trial.358
¶132 The prosecution has frequently relocated their witnesses preventively while waiting for a
decision from the VWU.359 The prosecution sought no prior authorisation from the Chamber to
348 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-428-Corr, Urgent Decision on
Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the
Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules, ¶¶ 45–47 (Apr. 25, 2008).
349 Id. ¶ 46.
350 See supra notes 95–99.
351 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, at ¶ 310 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-
Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 68).
352 Id. ¶ 158 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 44)
(Lavigne saying the prosecution and VWU often disagree on the necessity of the imposition of a particular
protective measure).
353 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-428-Corr, supra note 348, ¶ 14.
354 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶ 508.
355 As was frequently pointed out by the Lubanga defense. See, e.g., ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,
ICC-01/04-01/06-2773-Red-tENG, Closing Submissions of the Defence, ¶ 54 (July 15, 2011).
356 Press Conference held by Ocampo on 24 January 2012 relating to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision on the
confirmation of the charges in Kenya I and II, issued on January 23, 2012, YOUTUBE.COM,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-WYkNYXvug&feature=relmfu.
357 See, e.g., Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing
Brief, supra note 105, ¶¶ 509–10, n. 686 (citing a Chamber’s confidential decision where the Chamber expresses its
surprise with regard to the international relocation of P-28 notwithstanding the VWU’s assessment that P-28’s
security concerns did not warrant this measure). See also Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-428-Corr, supra note 348, ¶¶
41–52.
358 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-428-Corr, supra note 348, ¶¶ 9, 12, 15, 18–19, 22.
359 Id. ¶¶ 11–52.
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implement this measure, nor is there any statutory mandate to do so.360 This practice of
“preventive relocation” forces the issue of permanent relocation and thus effectively shifts the
power to decide whether relocation is necessary from a neutral organ within the Registry to the
prosecution.361 Indeed, in the view of the Pre-Trial Chamber, once a witness has been relocated,
his or her return to his or her former residence “would be disruptive for the witness and his or her
family and would also most likely put them at risk.”362 Accordingly, the practice of unilateral
preventive relocation has been forbidden by the Statute, as confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber
and Appeals Chamber.363
¶133 The Pre-Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber also criticized the prosecution’s “reactive
relocation,” i.e., the relocating of witnesses whose request for relocation was rejected by the
VWU. Reactive relocation was found to infringe on the decision of the competent organ of the
Court to decide upon witness relocation.364 In cases of disagreement between the assessment of
the VWU and the Prosecutor, “the ultimate arbiter of whether the serious measure of relocation
be undertaken is the Chamber.”365 This practice has led to the exclusion of the statements of two
prosecution witnesses at the confirmation hearing of Katanga and Ngudjolo.366
¶134 The high number of relocations, including both “preventive” and “reactive” relocation
(which has since been banned), leaves the impression that the ICC has relocated many witnesses
even where this was not absolutely necessary. Doubts about its necessity in many cases increase
when a comparison is made with the practice of the ICTY and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). At the ICTY, which began operations when the war in Yugoslavia
was still ongoing and where ethnic tensions were still strong, “[l]ess than a fraction of one per
cent of witnesses have been granted long-term protection such as relocation to third
countries.”367 At the ICTR, dealing with an equally tense situation, relocation of witnesses is also
“highly exceptional.”368
¶135 It is also not the case that witnesses being identified by their communities before they
testify will necessarily incur harm or danger warranting relocation. Most people are simply eager
to make a living and have no interest in threatening or harming potential witnesses. It is true that,
particularly in small villages, local people are often aware of the identities of prosecution
witnesses even before the defense is. Word spreads quickly.369 Not infrequently, the witnesses
themselves speak about it.370 This, however, does not mean that someone’s security is
immediately threatened or that life in their home village becomes dangerous for them, even if
neighbours or family members disagree with a witness’s choice to testify for the prosecution. At
360 Id. ¶¶ 21–31.
361 Id. ¶¶ 25, 32.
362 Id. ¶ 25.
363 Id. ¶¶ 20–37; Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-776, Judgment on the
Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the “Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive
Relocation and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules” of Pre-Trial Chamber I, ¶¶
1–2, 64–104 (Nov. 26, 2008).
364 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-428-Corr, supra note 348, ¶ 25; Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-776,
Judgment on Appeal of Prosecutor, supra note 363, ¶¶ 91–92.
365 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-776, Judgment on Appeal of Prosecutor, supra note 363, ¶ 2.
366 Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3266-Corr2-Red, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing Brief,
supra note 105, ¶ 508.
367 Witness Statistics, ICTY WEBSITE, http://www.icty.org/sid/10175.
368 See NANCY COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS, THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 141 (2010).
369 This is based on the author’s personal observation and experience.
370 Id.
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least one example proves this point. A witness who testified in the case of Katanga & Ngudjolo
and was relocated for security reasons returned to his community against OTP and VWU
advice.371 He has not faced any difficulties since his return although it is generally known in the
community that he testified as a witness for the prosecution.372
¶136 In this regard, it is noteworthy that, in the course of time, many ICC defendants lose their
strongholds in their home country, even if not their popularity.373
¶137 All of this suggests that the security concerns tend to be exaggerated and cannot be
measured by looking at the number of witnesses who were considered in need of protection.
C. Security Concerns Do Not Justify the Method Chosen
¶138 Even if the OTP’s security concerns both for OTP personnel and for people assisting the
OTP were entirely legitimate, those concerns would still not justify the outsourcing of the bulk of
the investigations to third parties such as intermediaries, the UN and NGOs. In outsourcing the
investigations, the prosecution simultaneously transfers the responsibility to solve security issues
to third parties. Witnesses’ risks do not diminish simply because investigative responsibility has
been delegated to others.
¶139 In DRC, the OTP took the firm position that reliance on intermediaries would help
circumvent security risks for OTP personnel as well as potential witnesses and informants.374
However, it does not take small communities very long to figure out that an intermediary works
for the OTP, which then defeats the purpose of using such an intermediary.375 Where security
risks are genuine, they would then equally affect informants and potential witnesses who are in
contact with the intermediary in question, as well as the intermediary himself.376 And an
intermediary does not enjoy the same protection from the ICC as OTP personnel.377
¶140 With regard to the UN and NGOs, the prosecution takes the position that it is safer for
these organizations to be present in volatile situations than for OTP personnel, given that these
organizations do not have a mandate to issue warrants of arrest against suspected war
criminals.378 On this logic, it would thus be safer for potential witnesses and informants to speak
to the UN and NGOs than to the ICC OTP.379
371 ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-2711-Conf, Version Publique de
la Décision Relative à la Requête du Bureau du Procureur aux Fins de Communiquer Avec le Témoin, P-250, (Feb.
18 2011), ICC-01/04-01/07-2711-Red (Mar. 10, 2011).
372 Id.
373 This particularly holds true for Germain Katanga and Thomas Lubanga who were both detained in Kinshasa for a
significant period of time before being transferred to the ICC. They were both arrested in Kinshasa on February 26,
2005. They were both replaced as chiefs of their politico-military organisations (FRPI and UPC respectively).
Germain Katanga left Ituri at the end of 2004, received the grade of general in the national Congolese army in
Kisangani in January 2005 and then arrived in Kinshasa in January 2005. With the exception of his family and
intimate friends, he has been out of touch with his community since. See, e.g., ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga
& Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1666-Red-tENG, Public Redacted Version of the “Decision on the
Motion of the Defence for Germain Katanga for a Declaration on Unlawful Detention and Stay of Proceedings” of
20 November 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1666-Conf-Exp), ¶¶ 2, 16–22 (Dec. 3, 2009).
374 See, e.g., supra notes 49–53.
375 This is based on the author’s personal experience and observations in the field.
376 This was the concern expressed by Déirdre Clancy at the ICC Conference, supra note 6. Clancy has been dealing
with intermediaries who were not relocated despite their claim that their security has been jeopardized as a result of
their cooperation with the ICC.
377 Id.
378 See, e.g., ICC-02/05-21, supra note 195, ¶¶ 16–18.
379 Id.
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¶141 This argument is unconvincing. NGOs mandated to uncover human rights abuses including
HRW and AI frequently submit highly critical reports condemning human rights abuses and
calling out for prosecutions of the alleged perpetrators.380 NGO reports sometimes even identify
alleged individual perpetrators by name.381 These reports often serve as the basis for subsequent
ICC investigations and prosecutions.382
¶142 NGOs have expressed concern that their cooperation with the ICC, if known to the public,
may impair “their ability to play a role in future conflicts.”383 Yet, some NGOs do little to hide
their cooperation with the ICC prosecution and even refer to it on their website.384 As well, in an
amicus brief, submitted in the DRC situation, the Womens’ Institute for Gender Justice
broadcasted to the entire world the fact that it had conducted interviews in the DRC, and
transmitted its findings to the ICC Prosecutor.385
¶143 The Prosecutor also regularly and publicly provides the names of the organizations that
cooperate with the OTP.386 Not that such references are needed for the public at large to
understand that an NGO like HRW or the UN is cooperating with the ICC prosecution. In light
of their shared mandate of uncovering human rights violations, this is obvious and natural.
¶144 There is then no apparent reason why it would be safer for the UN and NGOs than for the
ICC OTP to be present in any conflict zone. Nor would witnesses and informants who speak to
NGOs or the UN necessarily be safer than those who speak to the ICC OTP directly. It might
even be the other way round, as the ICC has greater powers to protect witnesses than NGOs or
the UN.
¶145 In any event, investigations in war-torn or violent societies will always involve some level
of risk no matter how much one seeks to reduce it: this cannot be allowed to reduce the quality of
the investigation to the extent the OTP has done so far. As Arbour says: “security challenges
particular to investigation of international crimes while an armed conflict is ongoing should not
per se prevent the Court from acting in pursuance of its international mandate towards timely and
effective individual criminal accountability.”387
¶146 Investigations are generally most efficient when conducted in the immediate aftermath of
the commission of the crimes. When there is an ongoing conflict, the best investigations are
those conducted during the conflict rather than after it is over, by which time evidence may be
lost or destroyed by interested parties.388 In relation to Darfur in 2006, Cassese warned that
380 See, e.g., D.R. Congo: Army Should Not Appoint War Criminals 1, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (January 2005),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/01/13/dr-congo-army-should-not-appoint-war-criminals.
381 Id. at 1, naming as Jérôme Kakwavu, Floribert Kisembo, Bosco Ntaganda and Germain Katanga as persons
“alleged to have committed serious human rights abuses including war crimes and crimes against humanity.” See
also supra note 214.
382 This is apparent, for instance, from the Prosecutor’s Second Report. SECOND REPORT, supra note 208, ¶ 58. See
also the joint public letter from NGOs addressed to the ICC Prosecutor, (July 31, 2006)
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/DRC_joint_letter_eng.PDF.
383 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 224, at 1.
384 See, e.g., Objectives, WOMEN’S INITIATIVE FOR GEND. JUSTICE http://www.iccwomen.org/aboutus/mission.php
(last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (citing as one of its objectives “ensuring sexualized violence and gender based crimes are
a priority in the investigations and prosecutions of the ICC”). It is also worthy to note that the ICC Prosecutor
recently appointed the Executive Director of the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, as the Special Gender
Advisor. ICC Prosecutor Appoints Brigid Inder as Special Gender Advisor, WOMEN’S INITIATIVE FOR GEND.
JUSTICE (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.iccwomen.org/news/berichtdetail.php?we_objectID=168.
385 See ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-373 (Aug. 20, 2007).
386 Supra note 373.
387 ICC-02/05-19, supra note 196, ¶ 76 (Oct. 10, 2006).
388 See however Whiting’s sensible observation that some evidence does not become available until a significant
period after the conflict. According to Whiting, with time, informants may be more inclined to offer information,
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valuable testimonial evidence, as well as documents, such as minutes of security meetings, flight
records and orders issued by the military authorities in Khartoum to the military authorities in
Darfur, would perish if investigations were not carried out immediately.389 The same can be said
about other situations.
D. A Comparison with the ad-hoc Tribunals
¶147 The security concerns outlined above are not new to the ICC. Investigators from other
international criminal tribunals have had to carry out investigations in difficult and volatile
circumstances. This particularly holds true for the ICTY investigators, who had to operate while
the war was still ongoing in parts of the former Yugoslavia. Neither their limited numbers, nor
fears for themselves or potential witnesses stopped the ICTY investigators from conducting
efficient investigations.390 Investigators gathered thousands of pages of documentary, forensic,
and testimonial evidence.391 The ICTY was also successful in that all its suspects from all
warring parties have eventually been surrendered to it.392 The ICTR was similarly successful in
managing to try most indictees (although on many other fronts, the ICTR is not exemplary).393
¶148 Alex Whiting, former ICTY and current ICC prosecutor, expressed the view that the ICC
cannot fairly be compared with the ad-hoc Tribunals because the ICC faces “substantial
additional challenges.”394 In light of those challenges, Whiting stated that “[t]here is a risk in
thinking that since the ad-hoc Tribunals performed beyond expectations, somehow the ICC will
do as well.”395
¶149 Why would the ICC not perform as well as the ad-hoc Tribunals? What are those
challenges preventing the ICC from doing so?
¶150 It is often suggested that the ad-hoc Tribunals had an easier task than the ICC because they
had more means than the ICC to enforce cooperation on unwilling states. Having been
“either because they in time recognize that it is in their self-interest to do so, or because passions have sufficiently
cooled to make cooperation possible. Accordingly, the passage of time can result in a more complete and truer
picture of the circumstances of the alleged crime.” Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Law, Justice Delayed
Can Be Justice Delivered, 50 HARV. INT’L L. J. 323, 327 (2009).
389 ICC, Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-14, Observations on Issues Concerning Protection of Victims, supra note
196.
390 At the Review Conference, former ICTY Prosecutor Mark Harmon emphasised that the ICTY investigators were
very few in numbers by comparing the ICTY investigations into the Srebenica massacre in 1995 with the US
investigations into a domestic terrorist attack on the Oklahoma federal court house in that same year resulting in 168
deaths. In Sebrenica, only five investigators were available to investigate while the war was still ongoing. In
Oklahoma, over 2500 agents had been assigned to investigate the case. See Transcript of Atrocity Crimes Litigation
Year-In-Review Conference, 46–47 (Mar. 14, 2012).
391 See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak & Mladen Markač, IT-06-90-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 45, 
74–84, 94–100, 454, 456, 465, 509–20, 1399, 1465 (Apr. 15, 2011); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović, Ljubiša 
Beara, Drago Nikolić, Ljubomir Borovčanin, Radivoje Miletić, Milan Gvero & Vinko Pandurević, IT-05-88-T, 
Judgment ¶¶ 237, 367, 372, 411–12, 502, 523, 544, 550, 565–66, 598, 607 (June 10, 2010).
392 Patrick Lopez-Terres, Arrest and Transfer of Indictees: The Experience of the ICTY (Dec. 15, 2006) (on file with
author) (paper presented by then-Chief of Investigations at the ICTY to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor). See also
CARLA DEL PONTE & CHUCK SUDETIC, MADAME PROSECUTOR: CONFRONTATIONS WITH HUMANITY’S WORST
CRIMINALS AND THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY (2009).
393 See, e.g., Accused at Large, ICTR WEBSITE,
http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/77/Default.aspx?id=12&mnid=12. The ICTR has, however, been criticized for
indicting only one party to the conflict. See, e.g., Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The Impunity Gap of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV., 70–
76 (2011).
394 Whiting, supra note 61, at 230.
395 Id.
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established by the Security Council under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the ICTY
and ICTR have primary jurisdiction in respect to crimes described in their Statutes committed in
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively.396 All states are under a statutory duty to
cooperate fully with the ICTY and ICTR.397 These ad-hoc Tribunals can report any refusal of
states to cooperate fully to the Security Council, which can then take measures against these
uncooperative states.398
¶151 The ICC, on the other hand, has concurrent jurisdiction and was established on the basis of
a treaty.399 The ICC has no effective power to take compulsory measures against states that fail
to abide by their obligations, which, according to Kress and Prost, “constitutes a serious
weakness” of the ICC.400
¶152 In reality, this distinction between the ICC and the ad-hoc Tribunals is more academic than
profound. Irrespective of their status, all international criminal courts and tribunals are fully
dependent on the cooperation of states, be it for allowing the parties to investigate on the ground,
obtaining state security documents or securing arrests.401
¶153 Even if, on paper, the ICTY and ICTR have more enforcement powers than the ICC, they
can only put them into effect with the support of the powerful states willing and able to put
economic and/or political pressure on non-cooperative states.402 In the case of the ICTY, the
powerful states were prepared to condition aid programs and admission to international
organizations upon the cooperation of states with the ICTY. Unquestionably, this was an
essential reason for the ICTY’s success. Though initially thoroughly unwilling to cooperate with
the ICTY, the Yugoslav authorities eventually gave in to significant political and financial
bargains.403 The ICTY had an additional advantage of benefiting from the assistance from NATO
forces deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina in arresting ICTY suspects.404
¶154 In the case of the ICTR, on the other hand, the powerful states did not show willingness to
challenge the current regime in Rwanda in blocking any proper investigations into crimes
allegedly committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) whose leaders form the
396 ICTY Statute, art. 7(2) (Sept. 2009); ICTR Statute, art. 8(2) (Jan. 31, 2010); ICTY RPE, Rules 8, 11, 56–58 (July
24, 2009); ICTR RPE, Rules 8, 11, 56–58 (Oct. 1, 2009). See also Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes, supra
note 16, at 127–42.
397 ICTY Statute, art. 29 (Sept. 2009); ICTR Statute, art. 28 (Jan. 31, 2010).
398 Where State authorities fail to comply with an obligation under any of the Rules in conjunction with article 29 of
the ICTY Statute or article 28 of the ICTR Statute, the President may report the matter to the Security Council if
satisfied that this is indeed the case. ICTY RPE, Rules 7bis, 11, 59(B); ICTR RPE, Rules 7bis, 11, 59(B).
399 ICC Statute, arts. 12, 17 (Nov. 29, 2010).
400 Claus Kress & Kimberly Prost, Article 93, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVER’S NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1576 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2nd ed. 2008). See also
Gilbert Bitti, Article 64, in COMMENTARY, supra at 1213. This was one of the arguments raised by the Defence for
Germain Katanga in support of its submission that the ICC may not be able to offer the accused a fair trial. See ICC,
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-949, Motion Challenging the
Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of Germain Katanga, Pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute, ¶ 24 (Mar.
11, 2009).
401 ICTY Statute, art. 7(2) (Sept. 2009); ICTR Statute, art. 8(2) (Jan. 31, 2010); ICTY RPE, Rules 8, 11, 56–58 (July
24, 2009); ICTR RPE, Rules 8, 11, 56–58 (Oct. 1, 2009); ICC Statute, Part IX (Nov. 29, 2010).
402 As Carla Del Ponte pointed out, despite the legal obligation on States to cooperate, this is not always enforceable
in reality. Carla Del Ponte calls this lack of political independence the greatest weakness of international criminal
justice. See Del Ponte’s observations expressed at the Tribunal Penal International Pour le Rwanda: Modele ou
Contre-Modele pour la Justice Internationale? Le Point de Vue des Acteurs, Conference held in Geneva in May
2009.
403 See Lopez-Terres, supra note 392.
404 This was made possible by the adoption of a new Rule 59bis, explicitly allowing peacekeeping forces deployed
in Bosnia-Herzegovina to arrest ICTY indictees. See id.
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government.405 Carla Del Ponte who pushed hard to initiate such investigations was soon lifted
from her position as the chief Prosecutor of the ICTR.406 Until today, these alleged crimes have
been left untouched.407 This clearly demonstrates that the success of an international court or
tribunal does not depend on its legal status, but rather on the political willpower to take action
against uncooperative governments.
¶155 There is no reason why pressure cannot be put on uncooperative governments within the
context of ICC proceedings. In signing the Rome Statute, States Parties have committed
themselves to cooperate fully with the Court.408 Failure to do so can be reported to the Assembly
of States Parties.409 If the political will is strong enough, the States Parties, supported by
powerful non-party states like the US, can put political and economic pressure on unwilling
states in the same fashion as they could in the case of the ICTY.
¶156 Moreover, the legal distinction between the ICC and the ad-hoc Tribunals disappears
completely in ICC situations based on Security Council referrals.410 The status is then similar to
the ad-hoc Tribunals in that the ICC can impose its jurisdiction on an unwilling non-party state
and that the Security Council can take measures against uncooperative states.411 However, that is
not to say that the cooperation of an unwilling state can be enforced so easily, as is apparent in
the case of Sudan. The willingness and ability to put pressure on uncooperative states will vary
from situation to situation depending on the political context.
¶157 Another suggested difference between the ICC and the ad-hoc Tribunals is that, because
the ICC is a permanent institution, states and organizations will be more cautious in offering
assistance to it than to the ad-hoc Tribunals. The reason for a more cautious approach would be
that such assistance would not necessarily be sought on a one-off basis only and might have
implications for their work in future conflicts.412 So far, this clearly did not make the NGOs more
cautious in their cooperation with the Court. They continue to cooperate fully, and quite openly
too.413 The Prosecutor often expresses gratitude for the continuous cooperation from the UN,
NGOs and governments.414
¶158 A more compelling argument is that the ICTY and ICTR had the luxury of being able to
focus on one conflict only over the course of many years. Only with time did they manage to get
access to the important documents and crime scenes.415 The ICC has a much wider geographical
scope, and must therefore spread its focus and resources over numerous unrelated situations
simultaneously. As HRW observed, “[t]his risks the adoption of a shallow approach” because
“the practical difficulties” and “resource constraints” in each situation are “considerable” and
“real.”416 The task of the ICC Prosecutor is, therefore, “even more complex” than that of the
ICTY or ICTR Prosecutor.417
405 See Haskell, supra note 393.
406 See Carla Del Ponte’s Observations at the Geneva Conference, supra note 402.
407 See id.; see also Haskell, supra note 393.
408 ICC Statute, Part IX (Nov. 29, 2010).
409 ICC Statute, art. 87(7) (Nov. 29, 2010).
410 ICC Statute, art. 13(b) (Nov. 29, 2010).
411 This is so because, in referring a situation to the ICC, the Security Council is acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations. See id.
412 Whiting, supra note 61, at 228–29.
413 See supra notes 380–86.
414 THIRD REPORT, supra note 210, ¶¶ 10–12; FOURTH REPORT, supra note 201, ¶ 9.
415 Whiting, supra note 61, at 230.
416 HRW, supra note 304, at 8.
417 Id.
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¶159 This is a valid point, but it is outweighed by several others. First, the ICC has had ten years
to overcome initial difficulties and set in place a sustainable and responsible investigatory
strategy. Second, the ICC has certain advantages over the ICTY and ICTR. The ICC can learn
from the experience of the ad-hoc Tribunals in dealing with similar difficulties, as well as their
mistakes. The ICTY and ICTR did not have the luxury of modern precedent. Third, the ICC has
more legitimacy given that it is based on a treaty signed by consenting states. The creation of the
ad-hoc Tribunals was much more controversial and subject to criticism.418 The ICC has 121
member states and this number still increases. This signifies that the ICC continues to have wide
support.
¶160 Thus, the ICC has all the potential to become an effective court fully backed by a large
number of states, the UN, NGOs and other organizations. There is, then, no apparent reason why
the ICC could not be as efficient as the ad hocs.
¶161 It would appear that the future success of the ICC depends on the willingness of the
international community to support the Court, as well as on its own attitude and the efforts it is
willing to make to achieve efficiency. The ICTY had to fight hard to overcome many obstacles
in the way to its success. Initially, the ICTY investigators had a rough time in acquiring access to
certain crime-base areas and crucial witnesses, particularly in the Republika Srpska within
Bosnia and Herzegovina.419 However, with time and persistence, they eventually managed to
investigate the bulk of the most significant crimes committed by all sides, including Serbs,
Croats and Muslims throughout the former Yugoslavia.420 The ICTY succeeded in doing so
because it took its investigations seriously and had pride in its achievements. It took a tough
approach to uncooperative governments. It did not bend to pressure from the Yugoslav
authorities, but rather sought the support of the EU and the US to pressure them into
cooperation.421
¶162 The ICC’s strategy has been different: when four officers of the court were detained in
Zintan, Libya for nearly a month, only one public request was made for their immediate
release.422 Then the ICC made a statement that can be interpreted as an apology to the Libyan
authorities with the purpose of getting the ICC officials released.423 Upon their release, the ICC
President thanked both the Libyan and the Zintan authorities for their cooperation.424
¶163 What cooperation? Can this be the right message to send to uncooperative authorities;
namely that they can frustrate the work of the Court without fearing any consequences?
418 Lopez-Terres, supra note 392.
419 Id.
420 There has even been a case against two citizens of Macedonia for crimes committed against ethnic Albanians.
This case concerned two accused: Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski. Ljube Boškoski was acquitted and Johan 
Tarčulovski was sentenced to 12 years. See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Ljube Boškoski & Johan Tarčulovski, IT-04-82-T, 
Judgment (July 10, 2008).
421 Lopez-Terres, supra note 392.
422 ICC, Press Release, Four ICC Staff Members Detained in Libya, ICC-CPI-20120609-PR805 (June 9, 2012),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/pr805. One more statement was made
by the President of the Assembly of States Parties, expressing concern about their continued detention. See President
of the Assembly, Statement on the Situation of ICC staff in Libya, ICC-ASP-20120612-PR807, (June 12, 2012),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/51827832-C129-40B1-869D-A76FA85DC36B.htm.
423 ICC, Press Release, Statement on the Detention of Four ICC staff members, ICC-CPI-20120622-PR815 (June
22, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/pr815.
424 ICC, Press Release, The Four ICC Staff Members Released in Libya, ICC-CPI-20120702-PR820 (July 2, 2012),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/pr820.
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
A. Revision of Vision
¶164 In light of the above, it is clear that there are systematic problems with the OTP
investigation strategy that need to be addressed. Elena Baylis, 425 Chris de Vos, 426 and Brenda
Hollis,427 prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, have all suggested adoption of
guidelines governing relations between the court and third parties. Julie Flint and Alex de Waal
suggest that the Prosecutor should increase the investigation budget and employ more
investigators to carry out more thorough investigations.428 These are sensible suggestions that
may help to ensure that, in future cases, the OTP complies with the highest investigation
standards, keeps greater control over the method of the investigations and provides more clarity
about its relationship with third parties.429
¶165 The implementation of any of these suggestions can, however, only be successful if the
OTP radically changes its approach vis-à-vis investigations. To date, the greatest concern is an
apparent lack of genuine interest in the higher reaches of the ICC OTP in more efficient
investigations. Indeed, the fair-minded observer easily gains the impression that security
concerns or budget restraints are used as a shield to justify deficiencies in the investigations. For
instance, in Kenya, even the most obvious steps such as the obtaining of transcripts or videos of
public speeches were not taken. No security threat or budget restraint would have stood in the
way of investigators obtaining such material.
¶166 In the Darfur situation, the Prosecutor expressed the view that the OTP was perfectly able
to conduct meaningful investigations without stepping foot in Darfur.430 Whilst undoubtedly
some effective steps can be taken outside the situation country, an investigation cannot be
complete—and it cannot focus on incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally—without
visiting the crime scene. Cassese and Arbour understood this; the former ICC Prosecutor did not.
¶167 In the DRC, the Executive Committee of the Prosecutor’s Office was of the view that the
witnesses’ own testimony was sufficient evidence of their age.431 Thus, it was considered
unnecessary to double-check information from witnesses. In Lubanga, intermediary P-143
provided some documents to identify whether the children, in terms of age, could be linked with
particular classes of students within identified age ranges but was instructed not to attempt to
obtain birth certificates at the Mayor’s Office in Bunia or Mudzipela.432 For similar reasons, no
attempts were made to obtain their identity cards from the Independent Electoral Commission.433
¶168 Inefficient investigations have led, in part, to the non-confirmation of four out of fourteen
cases and the acquittal of one accused. And unless there is a radical change in attitude, the lack
of interest in effective investigations may result in more acquittals of individuals who should
otherwise have been convicted. It is unprecedented for the second accused before an
425 Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, supra note 7, at 145–47.
426 De Vos, Case Note, supra note 7, at 17–19.
427 See observations of Brenda Hollis at ICC Conference, supra note 6.
428 Flint & de Waal, supra note 48, at 23, 30–31.
429 Supra, section II.D.2.d (Non-Transparent Nature of Relationship).
430 ICC-02/05-19, supra note 196, ¶¶ 20–22; Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-14, Observations on Issues Concerning
Protection of Victims, supra note 196, ¶ 19.
431 Lubanga Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, supra note 1, ¶ 170 (citing Lavigne Deposition, ICC-01/04-01/06-
Rule68Deposition-Red2-ENG, supra note 24, at 15–16).
432 Id. ¶ 173.
433 Id. ¶ 175.
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international criminal court or tribunal to be acquitted. The case against Ngudjolo fell apart
because it was built upon unreliable witnesses. This is a striking outcome.
¶169 Fortunately, there is reason to hope that this attitude may change. During a meeting held at
the American Society of International Law on September 21, 2012, the new Prosecutor, Fatou
Bensouda, said it was one of her priorities to improve investigations.434 Similarly, at a recent
conference in The Hague, the representative of the ICC prosecution conceded that some of the
criticism with regard to the OTP’s investigations was legitimate and that, within the bounds of
budgetary restraints, the OTP was working towards an improved investigation policy.435 This is
promising, and a clear departure from the ICC Prosecution Coordinator’s initial reaction
expressed at the Review Conference that the Lubanga judges had been “overly harsh” in their
criticism.436 It remains to be seen whether the improvements that are put in place will be
sufficiently radical to repair the very serious deficiencies in the OTP investigations.
B. Increased or Improved Management of Investigation Budget
¶170 To increase the efficiency of the investigations, it is important that a sufficient number of
investigators are employed for each situation. The author agrees with Flint and de Waal that, if
the OTP does not have a large enough pool of investigators to address each situation adequately,
new investigators should be recruited. At least some of them should have experience in
conducting criminal investigations and expertise in collecting forensic evidence, little of which
has been done so far.437 Investigators should further be provided with sufficient funds to cover
their travel and other expenses made in the course of the investigations. To do so, it might be
necessary to increase or improve the management of the investigation budget. Conducting
effective investigations is an expensive business. In 2009, Whiting stated that additional funds
were required for the ICC to be as successful as the ad hoc Tribunals in investigating and
prosecuting suspected war criminals.438
¶171 It is conceded that acquiring additional funds in a situation of worldly financial crisis is not
a simple task. Currently, the budget is frozen. The states parties are unwilling to raise their
financial contributions although the number of ICC situations is increasing.439 The current
Prosecutor has indicated that she will do her best to seek to persuade the states parties to increase
the budget by making them realize that insufficient funding undermines the quality of the
investigations.440
¶172 If unsuccessful and if genuinely impossible to improve the quality of the investigations
without a budget increase, the OTP may have to take a step back and concentrate on fewer




435 See observations of Alex Whiting at ICC Conference, supra note 6.
436 Transcript of Atrocity Crimes Litigation Year-In-Review Conference, 14 (Mar. 14, 2012), per Sara Criscitelli.
She however added that she respected the authority of the Court and that such firm public criticism is a good thing in
the sense that “[i]t does send a signal that this court is not sort of a kangaroo court, it’s not in the pocket of the
prosecution, it’s not willing to tolerate any kind of measure.”
437 As noted by Trial Chamber II in the Ngudjolo Judgment, ICC-01/04-02/12-3, supra note 18, ¶ 118, in that case
there was a clear absence of medical or other forensic evidence to identify the victims. The OTP had conducted only
one forensic mission in 2009 (id. at n. 266) but that was too late to have any probative value.
438 Whiting, supra note 61, at 230.
439 HRW, supra note 304, at 47. See also Bensouda, supra note 423.
440 See Bensouda, supra note 423.
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situations. Arguably, it is better to investigate fewer situations thoroughly than more situations in
a “shallow” fashion.441
¶173 This author, however, suspects that none of this is necessary; that the funds currently
available to the OTP are sufficient to conduct effective investigations. Apparently, the OTP
currently has forty-five investigators, which, although on the lower side, should be a sufficient
number to conduct efficient investigations in seven situations simultaneously.442 This is all the
more obvious if compared with the means available to the defense. A defense team ordinarily has
one or two investigators and a significantly lower investigation budget than the prosecution.443
Yet, they succeeded in paying regular visits to the crime sites and other important locations,
obtaining relevant documents and interviewing a significant number of potential witnesses and
informants.444
¶174 The defense situation suggests that the funds available to the prosecution may simply have
to be managed more economically while prioritizing the quality of the investigations. A higher
percentage of the overall prosecution budget might have to be allocated to investigations.445
¶175 Whatever the best solution is, budgetary restraints should not be allowed to prevent the
OTP from conducting effective investigations.446 In this regard, Bensouda rightly stated that one
should aspire to a “case-driven” court rather than a “resource-driven” court.447
C. Review of Investigation Strategy
¶176 It is also time for a wholesale review of the OTP investigation strategy. HRW has
expressed serious criticism with regard to the Prosecutor’s investigation strategy. According to
HRW, the OTP “simply ‘doesn’t get’ what is needed to redress the serious crimes committed.”448
Along with other observers,449 HRW stated that there is a need for “more coherent and effective
strategies in each situation.”450
¶177 The main aspect of investigation strategy in need of revision is the policy of focused
investigations. Pursuant to this policy, the OTP “will investigate and prosecute those who bear
the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes based on the evidence that emerges in the
course of an investigation.”451 The OTP selects a limited number of persons “situated at the
441 HRW, supra note 304, at 1–2, 8. See also Townsend, supra note 334, at 293.
442 See observations of Alex Whiting at ICC Conference, supra note 6.
443 In March 2012, the ICC decreased its legal aid budget. This decrease resulted in a cut in the salaries of members
of defense teams and victim representatives. After heavy negotiations with defense counsel, the defense
investigation budget has remained untouched. However, until now, there was significant leeway to request for
additional funds in conducting investigations, provided such request was justified. The defense in Lubanga and
Katanga & Ngudjolo sought and received further funds on at least two occasions. With the budget limitations, it is
questionable whether such requests will be approved in the future. See internal ICC documents, on file with author.
444 This is based on the author’s own experience. In Lubanga, the defense succeeded in bringing to light the
misconduct of certain intermediaries because it spent sufficient time in Ituri. Also, as noted by Trial Chamber II in
the judgment of Ngudjolo, supra note 18, ¶ 121, it was the defense, rather than the prosecution, which produced
most documents relating to the age of the witnesses.
445 See, however, Bensouda’s observation that the OTP is already doing all it can to operate within the budgetary
restraints. Bensouda, supra note 423.
446 See HRW, supra note 304, at 46.
447 Bensouda, supra note 423.
448 HRW, supra note 304, at 46.
449 See, e.g., Katy Glassborow, ICC Investigative Strategy Under Fire, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Oct.
17, 2008), http://iwpr.net/report-news/icc-investigative-strategy-under-fire.
450 HRW, supra note 304, at 46.
451 Prosecutorial Strategy, 2009–2012, ICC WEBSITE, ¶ 19 (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.icc-
Vol. 11:3] Dr. Caroline Buisman
79
highest echelons of responsibility”452 and a limited number of incidents.453 This policy was put in
place and continues to be in effect because it enables the OTP “to carry out short investigations;
to limit the number of persons put at risk by reason of their interaction with the Office; and to
propose expeditious trials while aiming to represent the entire range of victimization.”454 The
OTP does not perceive its task to include the establishment of “comprehensive historical records
for a given conflict.”455 Rather, “incidents are selected to provide a sample that is reflective of
the gravest incidents and the main types of victimization.”456
¶178 This policy is strongly supported by some senior OTP members who see it as a means to
accelerate the investigations and help the OTP bring cases faster, rather than dragging on
investigations for years.457
¶179 In principle, there is nothing objectionable about this policy; prosecutors in international
justice cannot prosecute everyone and focus on all alleged crimes committed. The Prosecutor
should not be, and is not here, criticized for pursuing the persons bearing greatest responsibility
for the most serious crimes.
¶180 This article is concerned with how those people and incidents are chosen. Regrettably, it
appears the focus is determined not in consultation with the OTP investigators after conducting
field investigations, but rather by the Prosecutor based on a review of preliminary information
gathered by third parties.458 Consequently, upon arrival, investigators are to focus strictly on
previously selected incidents and perpetrators and ignore any other evidence they come across in
the course of their investigations. In the case of Lubanga, former investigators apparently had
been collecting evidence of various crimes in the course of a year and a half but were then told to
focus on child soldiers only.459
¶181 This is troubling. The focus on specific crimes and perpetrators cannot be determined
properly before a thorough field-investigation has taken place. It should be the OTP’s own
independent investigation that determines the focus, not the other way round. If the ultimate
focus were determined solely on third party evidence, the Prosecutor would act in violation of his
statutory duty to conduct independent investigations. Perhaps as a result of a too quick
determination of the focus,460 the selection so far of the alleged crimes and perpetrators,
particularly in the DRC, has been criticized.461 In selecting the focus and generally in stipulating
the investigation policy, it is important that the Prosecutor listen closely to those with experience








457 Glassborow, supra note 449 (citing an interview with Le Fraper du Hellen).
458 Id. (citing interviews with former investigators).
459 Id.
460 Former investigators reportedly told IWPR that the Prosecutor was so rushed to bring cases before the ICC that
insufficient analysis of information gathered through other sources was done before investigators were sent out on
missions. As a consequence, they felt ill prepared. See Glassborow, supra note 449.
461 HRW questions the OTP’s independence and impartiality in selecting the defendants. See HRW, supra note 304,
at 11–12.
462 The ICC lost a number of high quality investigators because they were frustrated by the fact that the Prosecutor
attached so little importance to the investigations or the voice of experience in the way they were carried out. See
Glassborow, supra note 449.
NORT HWE S T E RN JOURNAL O F INT E RNAT IONAL HUM AN RI GH T S [ 2 0 1 3
80
¶182 The OTP’s practice of “sequencing” investigations has also raised concerns, because it
indicates that the OTP investigates the culpability of one warrant party at a particular time before
moving to another. The OTP believes this to be a more efficient investigation method.463 HRW
doubts this assertion and correctly points out that sequencing “has posed a significant challenge
to maintaining perceptions of impartiality.”464 In addition, sequencing increases the safety risks
for witnesses and informants by making the identity of the person against whom witnesses are
providing information to the OTP more obvious.
¶183 If sequencing is necessary to use the limited resources effectively, it would be better to
sequence entire situations rather than one side of the conflict before the other. Furthermore,
sequencing entire situations would allow the OTP to wrap up its “unfinished business,” which
continues to plague most of the situations.465
D. Permanent Presence in the Region
¶184 The author agrees with the observation made by HRW that the OTP “must improve its
field presence and the involvement of its field-based staff in policy setting.”466 The author
suggests that at least one international investigator should be present in the region under
investigation on a permanent basis.
¶185 Gaining the trust of local communities takes time and involvement. Once gained, that trust
genuinely facilitates the work of the investigators. Engendering trust may require simple gestures
such as paying a visit to the local chief. For these and other reasons, there is no substitute for
human contact between familiar faces in conducting investigations. Through a permanent
presence, the investigator(s) could attain knowledge and interest in the history of the conflict,
local culture and, ideally, language.467 If third party activity is necessary in certain activities
within an investigation, the permanent investigator(s) could ensure there is sufficient supervision
and scrutiny over those activities. The permanent investigator(s) could cooperate closely with
local and international NGOs, as well as the UN—without outsourcing the investigations in toto.
¶186 The permanent presence of one or more investigators could also improve security in the
region. Individuals or groups seeking to discourage potential witnesses from testifying might
think twice before doing so if immediate action by the ICC was a possibility. Moreover, Arbour
has expressed the view that the presence of the OTP in a volatile region could be an effective
part of an investigation strategy and have a positive impact on the human rights situation.468
Instead of relocating nearly everyone perceived to be in danger, the ICC could collaborate with
the local police to ensure more forceful reactions to any actual threats or violence. The
permanent presence of one or more investigators would be a key element in such a mechanism.
E. Verification of the Evidence
¶187 The practice of presuming the veracity of a witness’s account, or simply failing to buttress
it with other evidence, should stop. Investigators must diligently scrutinize this information.469
463 See observations of Alex Whiting at ICC Conference, supra note 6.
464 HRW, supra note 304, at 19.
465 Id. at 46–49.
466 Id. at 46.
467 HRW acknowledged that these are important ingredients of conducting thorough investigations. See id. at 8.
468 ICC-02/05-19, supra note 196, ¶¶ 70, 78.
469 As the prosecution alleges it does. See Katanga & Ngudjolo Trial Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-ENG,
supra note 196, at 37–38. However, as noted by Trial Chamber II in the Ngudjolo Judgment, ICC-01/04-02/12-3,
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To do so effectively, investigators must be allowed—even encouraged—to contact family
members and other close allies, neighbours, employers, teachers, fellow students or employees,
village chiefs, church leaders or other people with relevant information about the potential
prosecution witnesses. There are ways to do so without putting any witness at risk, and
investigators either should be trained accordingly, or, in the more likely scenario, should be
allowed to act on their prior training. This is particularly easy when witnesses are relocated,
because the risk to witnesses largely ceases at that point.
¶188 There is no good reason not to verify the records. Even if witnesses are not relocated,
questions about them can be asked in a manner that does not disclose that the questions relate to
witnesses for the prosecution. For instance, a classic technique probably known by all OTP
investigators is to ask similar questions about non-witnesses. Skilled and trained investigators
should be able to strike the right balance between obtaining necessary information and witness
protection. If the OTP hires the right investigators, those individuals should then be given more
leeway to make these and other determinations on the basis of their experience in the field.470
F. Clear Guidelines
¶189 The main view appears to be that the recruitment of intermediaries is essential for
successful investigations. The principal concern, therefore, is the method and extent to which
intermediaries have been deployed thus far. The solution proposed by the court and others is the
adoption of clear guidelines governing the relationship with intermediaries. It might not be
necessary to recruit intermediaries in the manner described. Rather than relying on
intermediaries, the OTP could employ local persons directly as investigators (or “resource
persons” as they are called by the defense). They would be accountable and their activities, role
and mandates would be transparent. As investigators, the local recruits would work directly with
the Prosecutor’s Office. Investigators could work with local informants on an ad hoc basis
without disclosing their identity unless this becomes a contentious issue.471 Their title is
irrelevant. A number of strict conditions should be applied. Their backgrounds should be
screened carefully and they should operate under the strict supervision and control of the
international investigators.
¶190 Additionally, there should be proper scrutiny and audit of the work done and the methods
used, as well as a clear understanding of disciplinary procedures in the case of misconduct. They
should be asked to sign confidentiality agreements and be made aware of the ethical and legal
obligations imposed on staff members of the Prosecutor’s Office. And, of course, they should be
trained properly.472
¶191 There should be full transparency about their relationship with the OTP and their identity
should be disclosed to the defense. This is particularly important if they are used frequently, as
they were in Lubanga and Katanga & Ngudjolo. On that note, it is also important that any draft
guidelines on the relationship with local recruits incorporate these suggestions and be finalized
and put into practice as soon as possible.
supra note 18, ¶ 121, the OTP failed to verify the age and military status of its witnesses. Rather, it was the defense
which collected the school bulletins of the prosecution witnesses, and other documents relevant to their age.
470 See Glassborow, supra note 449.
471 As Whiting put it, disclosure could be done “as a last resort,” supra note 61.
472 See Observations of International Prosecutors at ICC Conference, supra note 6.
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G. Cooperation
¶192 Rather than bowing its head to uncooperative governments, groups or individuals, the ICC
should adopt a “carrot and stick” approach to cooperation. Incentives for cooperation could,
through liaison with international trade organizations, be financial in nature. Additionally, the
ICC should consider creating a mechanism to ensure that those who obstruct the operation of the
Court face consequences. When dealing with individuals or local armed groups, like in the DRC,
the ICC should seek the cooperation from the local or state authorities or other organizations
such as the UN to investigate and penalize such conduct. When dealing with obstructionist states,
the ICC should seek international cooperation to put political or economic pressure on the
government in question. This is not an easy task, and its implementation will take time and
effort. But, as the ICTY has demonstrated in successfully implementing such a strategy, it can
work.473
V. CONCLUSION
¶193 One should not forget what is at stake. The crimes which are the subject of the OTP's
investigations are “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole” committed in the world’s most vulnerable locations.474 To outsource the responsibility
for investigations not only undermines the legitimacy of the ICC as an institution, it also deprives
the victims of accountability.
¶194 Within the world of international justice there is an overwhelming focus on the fact that
there was an arrest, there was a trial, and someone was convicted. It is not enough simply to
applaud the fact that there was a trial. When an individual is tried and sentenced on the basis of
investigations as flawed as those carried out in the Lubanga case, the principal losers are the
victims, who are entitled to a better quality of justice.
¶195 Lubanga was convicted of enlisting and conscripting child soldiers and using them to fight
his battles. These child soldiers were the victims of the offences he is found to have committed.
But the Chamber was not satisfied that even a single one of the witnesses whom the prosecution
called purporting to be victims had, in fact, been child soldiers. In other words, not a single one
of Lubanga’s victims ever got a chance to tell his or her story to the court and have it count. That
is not a victory; for the OTP, that is a shameful outcome. For the rest of the world, it is a
troubling one. Now that Ngudjolo has also been acquitted, the OTP should not be surprised if it
receives severe, but well-deserved criticism with respect to its investigative failures.
473 See supra section III.D (A Comparison with the ad-hoc Tribunals).
474 ICC Statute, Preamble (Nov. 29, 2010).
